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The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma 
in Criminal Procedure 
Mary D. Fan∗ 
Police gamesmanship poses a recurring regulatory challenge for 
constitutional criminal procedure, leading to zigzags and murky zones in 
the law such as the recent rule shifts regarding searches incident to arrest 
and interrogation. Police gamesmanship in the “competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime” involves tactics that press on blind spots, blurry 
regions or gaps in rules and remedies, undermining the purpose of the 
protections. Currently, courts generally avoid peering into the Pandora’s 
Box of police stratagems unless the circumvention of a protection becomes 
too obvious to ignore and requires a stopgap rule-patch that further 
complicates the maze of criminal procedure. The doctrine leaves murky 
the line between fair and foul play and sends an implicit message to the 
police to game covertly. A clearer understanding of this opaque zone of 
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intense pressures and the police gamesmanship dilemma is needed in order 
to better define and foster fair play and ameliorate rule strain. This Article 
takes up the task. 
The Article offers a taxonomy of the three main forms of problematic 
police gaming. The Article also proposes anti-gaming standards and data-
development remedial rules to help inculcate and enforce fair play values 
and address rule subversion and strain. The taxonomy distinguishes 
between desirable police innovation and problematic rule subversion and 
divides problematic police gaming into three variants: conduct rule 
gaming, remedial rule gaming, and framing rule gaming. Conduct rule 
gaming involves end-runs around the rules telling police how to behave to 
subvert the purpose of the rules, such as sending suspects abroad for 
violent interrogation or asking questions first, then administering a 
Miranda warning later. Remedial rule gaming takes advantage of gaps in 
rules telling officials how to remedy violations, such as the “standing” 
doctrine. Framing rule gaming exploits decision-framing doctrines telling 
courts how to address violations, such as averting judicial review by 
drawing on doctrines of deference and noninquiry.  
The Article argues for two approaches that would facilitate fairer play, 
improved monitoring, and internalization of rule-abiding behavior and 
norms by the police. First, the Article argues for deploying anti-gaming 
standards to supplement bright-line rules on issues where the incentive to 
game is high because the potential evidentiary payoff is direct. Second, the 
Article argues for reorienting the predominant remedial approach to 
incorporate data-development remedies that surface problems sooner and 
give police incentive to cooperate in monitoring and reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Police gaming of the rules of constitutional criminal procedure 
presents a recurring regulatory challenge. Police gamesmanship in the 
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”1 involves tactics that 
undermine the purpose of rules implementing constitutional 
protections by pushing on blind spots, blurry zones, or gaps in rules 
and remedies.2 Examples that have surfaced include such tactics as: 
• interrogators asking suspects questions first, getting an 
incriminating statement and then turning on the tape 
recorder, administering Miranda rights, and getting the 
 
 1 The oft-recurring metaphor of police investigation in constitutional criminal 
procedure is the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” See infra Part I.A and 
note 42. 
 2 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 933 
(3d ed. 1993) (defining gamesmanship as (1) “the art or practice of winning a sports 
contest by expedients of doubtful propriety (as by distracting an opponent) without 
actual violation of the rules of the game” and (2) “the use of ethically or intellectually 
dubious methods to achieve an objective”).  
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suspect to self-incriminate again in a post-advisal 
statement;3  
• detaining people using material witness warrants when 
there is insufficient evidence to charge any crime as an 
end-run around protections against detention without 
probable cause rather than part of any plan to have the 
person testify in a criminal case;4 
• shipping suspects overseas for interrogation to avoid 
prohibitions on use of violence and other highly coercive 
interrogation methods, then relying on the state secrets 
privilege or “special factors” doctrine to avert judicial 
review of alleged constitutional violations;5 and 
• ratcheting the power to arrest for minor traffic violations 
into an entitlement to search automobiles regardless of 
whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that there is 
evidence of the crime of arrest that the Supreme Court 
recently tried to address in Arizona v. Gant.6  
The specter of police gamesmanship also haunts the terrain after 
rule changes. For example, Gant tried to curtail the practice that police 
had been treating as prerogative of arresting for even a minor traffic 
offense to get a free pass to search the car incident to arrest.7 Initial 
indications suggest that the response to Gant’s attempted block is a 
rise in asserted “inventory searches” after arrest and arguments that 
evidence invalidly seized would inevitably have been discovered in an 
inventory search.8 A year after the Gant shakeup, the Supreme Court 
 
 3 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 4 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, No. 10-98, 2011 WL 2119110, at *3 (May 31, 2011) 
(describing alleged government practice); id. at *9 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting 
the majority “leaves unresolved whether the Government’s use of the Material Witness 
Statute in this case was lawful”). 
 5 E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (affirming dismissal of Bivens suit regarding alleged 
extraordinary rendition because of “special factors”); El-Masri v. United States, 479 
F.3d 296, 302-07, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of suit seeking redress for 
extraordinary rendition based on state secrets privilege). 
 6 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722-23 (2009).  
 7 For an account of the twisted course of law leading to Gant, see infra Part 
III.B.2.  
 8 See, e.g., United States v. Brunick, No. 09-30107, 2010 WL 1041369, at *1-2 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (holding search invalid under Gant as valid inventory search); 
United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
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granted certiorari in Davis v. United States, on the question of whether 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to reliance by 
the police on pre-Gant law for their automatic automobile searches 
incident to arrest.9 Another lurking question in Davis, however, is the 
inevitable discovery and inventory search rationale because even if the 
Court rules that the good-faith exception does not suspend the 
exclusionary remedy for the violation in the case, the denial of a 
remedy could at any rate be based on the government’s alternate 
inventory search and inevitable discovery rationale unless this route-
around Gant’s protection is narrowed or closed.10 Thus a stopgap 
protection may necessitate more patches as new fissures and cracks 
emerge under the pressure of rule-pushing and dodging. 
Or, to take another recent example, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Maryland v. Shatzer, permitting police to reinitiate interrogation 
without counsel after a fourteen-day break in custody despite previous 
invocation of the right to an attorney, has roused concern that police 
will wait two weeks and then take further shots at reinterrogation in 
an effort to wear the suspect down.11 Another recent shakeup in 
 
notwithstanding Gant, police would have inevitably discovered evidence in inventory); 
United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713, 714 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar); United States v. 
Sands, 329 F. App’x. 794, 798 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (similar); Cynthia Hujar Orr, 
Fear, Favor and Fidelity, CHAMPION, Aug. 2009, at 5 (noting that several months after 
Gant, trial lawyers have seen increase in auto inventory searches); Jack Ryan, Arizona v. 
Gant and Inventory Searches of Motor Vehicles, PUBLIC AGENCY TRAINING COUNCIL, 
http://www.patc.com/weeklyarticles/az_v_gant_inventory_searches.shtml (last visited 
July 1, 2010) (noting that one of most frequent post-Gant questions concerns inventory 
searches and noting that Gant has no impact on inventory searches).  
 9 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (mem.) (granting certiorari); see 
also United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264-66 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding Fourth 
Amendment violation, but declining to exclude because of good faith reliance on 
“clear and well-settled precedent” later overruled). 
 10 See United States v. Davis, No. 2:07-cr-0248-WKW, 2008 WL 1927377, at *1 
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 28, 2008) (holding that evidence, gun in jacket on car seat, would 
have been inevitably discovered in inventory search, and there were standard 
operating procedures in place for such search); cf. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1262 n.1 (noting 
that district court also held evidence would have inevitably discovered in inventory 
search, but declining to consider this ground because of conclusion that refusal to 
exclude could be based on good faith exception). 
 11 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (referring to 
Shatzer’s argument that if Court allowed police to reinterrogate suspect who invoked 
after break in custody, then police will briefly release and then reinterrogate); 
Christopher D. Totten, Commentary, New Federalism and Our Constitutional Rights in 
the Criminal Context, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. NO. 3, ART. 3, at n.37 (2002) (expressing 
concern that “the Shatzer ‘fourteen day rule’ is susceptible to abuse by officers who 
know that they can attempt to re-interrogate a suspect at continuous, 14-day intervals 
despite the fact that the suspect requested an attorney at the previous custodial 
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interrogation law, Berghuis v. Thompkins, holding that police can 
persist in questioning though the suspect remains largely silent for 
more than two hours,12 has prompted concern that police will take 
advantage of the taciturn, meek, and ignorant who do not know that 
they must defiantly and with precision invoke their right to silence.13 
To take a another example, opponents of Arizona’s controversial 
Senate Bill 1070, which creates the crime of not carrying immigration 
documents and orders state authorities to stop those reasonably 
suspected to be an “alien who is unlawfully present in the United 
States,”14 fear that the law will serve as a cover for targeting Latino 
people to create an atmosphere of intimidation and hostility regardless 
of immigration status.15 
Part of the complexity of the issue is that the doctrine and polity 
send mixed and ambivalent messages about police gaming. The law 
and doctrine oscillate between on the one hand desiring vigorous 
policing and giving police plenty of discretion to play hard and 
shrewdly around the rules and on the other hand, sometimes 
chastising the police for playing too hard, fast, and efficiently and 
intervening in strong ways to impede the power to investigate to 
safeguard space for civil liberties. The tense balance between police 
power and citizen liberty is maintained through efficiency-impeding 
rules that rein in police by raising the costs of more intrusive tactics to 
dampen their frequency.16 The regulatory approach of efficiency-
impeding has the side effect, however, of heightening the incentive to 
engage in gamesmanship pushing against the rules.  
 
interrogation”).  
 12 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257-59 (2010).  
 13 See, e.g., id. at 2266, 2276, 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (writing that Court 
“turns Miranda upside down” by imposing clear statement rule on defendants and 
observing “the Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use those magic 
words, and there is little reason to believe police — who have ample incentives to 
avoid invocation — will provide such guidance”).  
 14 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th 
Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (signed into law on Apr. 23, 2010), preliminarily enjoined, 
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 15 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2010, at A1; see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and 
Local Anti-’Alien’ Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 126-28 (2011) (analyzing how Arizona’s law conscripts police 
to be ominous embodiment of unwelcome for Latinos, whose ethnicity has been 
deemed relevant to alienage under United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-
87 (1975)). 
 16 See infra Part II. 
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The Court also seems to follow a sliding scale of concern, taking the 
most hands-off stance around the beginning of an investigation, when 
the Fourth Amendment is the main regulator, and deploying more 
searching scrutiny and protective standards after suspicion has 
attached to a particular person and the investigation has progressed 
further along, when the Fifth and Sixth Amendments become the 
prime regulators.17 The line between fair and foul play is left murky, 
with courts generally declining to peer into the Pandora’s Box of 
potentially problematic practices so long as jurists can posit 
“objective” bases justifying exercises of police power, even post hoc.18 
A potentially problematic practice generally does not get scrutiny 
except in the rare cases where circumvention of a protection is openly 
admitted or becomes too blatant to ignore, leading to fractured 
piecemeal patches.19 This don’t ask, don’t tell approach gives police 
incentive to play aggressively and covertly.  
A different approach is needed. The first step is to define what 
constitutes problematic gaming of the rules. Innovation is not the 
same as subversion. For example, police substitution away from 
prohibited physically coercive tactics and towards psychological 
methods such as building rapport or even using deception might be 
viewed as innovation rather than subversion.20  
This Article draws a baseline rule of thumb for when police conduct 
crosses the line into unfair rather than creative play from the cases 
where the Supreme Court has intervened albeit in fractured fashion. 
Gaming to get around the rules becomes problematic when it subverts 
the substance or purpose behind a rule. Using this yardstick, the 
Article argues that the diverse ways police game criminal procedure 
rules can be understood as variants of three main forms: conduct rule 
gaming, remedial rule gaming, and framing rule gaming. The 
framework draws on the distinction between conduct and decision 
rules adapted by Professors Meir Dan-Cohen and Carol Steiker from 
Jeremy Bentham’s work.21 Conduct rules in criminal law tell the public 
 
 17 See infra Part II.A.  
 18 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 
146, 153 (2004); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001) (per curiam); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996). 
 19 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that “the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here”).  
 20 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2147 
(2002) (explaining that shift in interrogation practices after Miranda from coercion to 
deception can be viewed as innovation that “both improved the quality of 
interrogation and reduced the level of police coercion”).  
 21 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
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how to behave.22 In criminal procedure — “criminal law for cops” — 
conduct rules tell police how to behave.23 Decision rules tell officials 
what to do when a conduct rule is violated.24 The Article expands the 
notion of decision rules to embrace not only remedial rules telling 
officials how to address violations of conduct rules by the police but 
also what the Article terms “decision-framing” doctrines influencing 
whether courts grant review or how courts frame rules or remedies. 
Conduct rule gaming involves police conduct that subverts the 
purpose of rules constraining police behavior, even if the technical 
letter of the rules is not clearly violated. Recent examples that have 
surfaced include such conduct as sending suspects abroad for 
physically coercive interrogation or asking questions first, then 
administering a Miranda warning and questioning again to get a 
“Mirandized” confession.25  
Decision rule gaming branches into two variants. The first, remedial 
rule gaming, exploits remedial gaps in rules telling officials how to 
respond to alleged violations, such as illegally searching a third party 
and using the evidence against the target who lacks standing to seek 
suppression.26 In remedial rule gaming, the police can engage in 
conduct rule transgressions secure in the knowledge that a remedial 
gap or exception means that there will be no remedy for the 
transgression. Thus, remedial rule gaming often facilitates a successful 
conduct rule gaming play.  
The second, framing rule gaming, ducks judicial review of violations 
by drawing on doctrines of deference and noninquiry, influencing 
what review, rules, or remedies, if any, courts offer. Framing rule 
 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626-29 (1984); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 2466, 2469 (1996). 
 22 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (1948) (contrasting rule that tells public 
how to conduct themselves — for example, do not steal — with rule that tells courts 
how to address violation — for example, sentencing to hanging whoever is convicted 
of stealing). 
 23 Steiker, supra note 21, at 2469-70. 
 24 Id.; see Dan-Cohen, supra note 21, at 628-29. 
 25 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (describing alleged seizure in United States and 
shipping overseas to Syria for interrogation and beatings); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600, 605, 612-15 (2004) (plurality opinion) (questions-first tactic). 
 26 E.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (refusing to exclude 
evidence in case where police illegally took briefcase from hotel room of suspect’s 
banker to gain documents to be used against suspect because break-in was violation of 
banker’s rights, not suspect’s rights). 
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gaming is the most subtle, potent, and potentially intractable of the 
three variants of gaming because it draws directly on judicial doctrines 
of noninquiry and deference to forestall review of potential conduct 
rule violations. An example is the use of the state secrets privilege and 
“special factors” analysis to avert judicial review of claims that 
authorities used foreign proxies or jurisdictional gradients in 
protections to evade constitutional conduct rules for police 
prohibiting use of violence and degradation in interrogation.27 These 
three variants can interact and be stacked for a successful play around 
the rules defining citizen rights.  
After laying a foundation for understanding the police 
gamesmanship dilemma, the Article advances two ideas for 
ameliorating the adverse consequences. The Article advocates 
incorporation of what it terms “anti-gaming standards” and “data-
development remedial rules.” The Article first argues that the current 
bright-line rule fetishism28 in framing constitutional criminal 
procedure’s mandates should be tempered by deploying anti-gaming 
standards to supplement or supplant “gameable rules” in high-risk 
zones where the incentive to game is highest because the potential 
evidentiary payoff is direct. Gameable rules are bright-line rules that 
enable end-runs around constitutional safeguards such as Belton’s rule 
of automatic power to search vehicles incident to arrest29 or the 
Supreme Court’s recent fourteen-day rule for re-initiation of 
questioning after invocation of Miranda rights in Maryland v. Shatzer.30 
While such bright-line rules are meant to provide easily administrable 
rules, the course of criminal procedure has illustrated that gameable 
rules tend not to serve their aim of simplicity nor keep their bright-
line shape — instead evolving offshoots and arms to accommodate or 
block rule-pushing.31 Bright-line rule fetishism also sends the wrong 
 
 27 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 563 (affirming dismissal of Bivens suit regarding 
alleged extraordinary rendition because of “special factors”); El-Masri v. United States, 
479 F.3d 296, 302-07, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of suit seeking redress 
for extraordinary rendition based on state secrets privilege). For an analysis, see infra 
Part II.B.2.a.  
 28 A play off Albert W. Alschuler’s apt term “bright-line fever” to signify the 
ossification into a fetish. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth 
Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 229 (1984).  
 29 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 30 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010). 
 31 See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.A; see e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a 
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 71 (1991) (observing that “even seemingly 
‘bright-line’ rules usually become blurred as the police and the adversarial process test 
their outer limits” and concluding “[t]he grail of ‘rule-oriented’ jurisprudence is as 
mythical as King Arthur’s”). 
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message and is perversely patronizing to police; it treats them as dim 
jocks who are not expected to understand or internalize the reasons 
behind the rules and conduct themselves according to these 
principles.32 
In contrast, because anti-gaming standards incorporate the reasons 
behind exceptions to the default rules of citizen protections, they 
educate and inform police judgment, trigger deliberation, and facilitate 
the internalization and implementation of the values served by 
constitutional criminal procedure.33 Moreover, when standards are 
pushed, judicial attempts to block gaming take the form of educating 
officers about the meaning of the standard, rather than a new twist or 
additions to the rulebook. Standards are flexible and capacious enough 
to absorb further elaboration without the need for complicated new 
structures of rules enunciating exceptions and qualifications.  
The second proposed reform is a reorientation of the predominant 
remedial approach when a violation is identified. The Article advocates 
data-development remedies to supplement the increasingly eroded 
exclusionary rule to surface potentially problematic practices and 
enable better-informed deliberation. The data-development remedial 
approach would give police a choice: voluntarily produce data on 
problematic practices and propose institutional reforms if needed to 
address practices that contribute to recurring violations or be subject to 
a penalty default designed to give police incentive to choose the 
voluntary information-generation and self-reform option. The penalty 
default approach sets default terms in a manner to incentivize the 
knowledgeable actor, here the police, to reveal information.34 An array 
of potential penalty defaults can be conceived. This Article opens the 
conversation by proposing three potential approaches which could be 
used singly or in combination: (1) discretionary court-ordered remedial 
data generation and reforms, or (2) referral to the Department of 
 
 32 See supra Part IV.A. 
 33 The virtues of standards are increasingly being heralded, particularly in the 
contexts of contracts and citizen, jury and judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1224-27 (2010) (explaining virtues of hazy norms in inducing 
and developing moral deliberation and agency among citizens and promoting 
democratic virtues such as participatory interpretation through practice and citizen 
education); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2037-39 
(2008) (explaining virtues of open-textured standards in substantive criminal law in 
empowering juries to exercise their discretion towards mercy where context warrants 
without stigmatizing label of jury nullification). 
 34 Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh, There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 589, 597 (2006); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90, 97-101 (1989). 
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Justice for inclusion on a watch list, or (3) for investigation under 42 
U.S.C. § 14141.35 This strategy takes a penalty default approach in the 
sense that it sets the default rule in the absence of voluntary 
cooperation at what the parties would rather not have — court-ordered 
data collection and institutional reform remedies.  
The data-development approach could supplement the increasingly 
eroded and embattled exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is 
under strain in part because of the fierce and sustained criticism that 
society is made to suffer for the constable’s blunder, depriving jurors 
of important evidence.36 In contrast, the data-development remedial 
approach enriches the store of knowledge for the blunder as well as 
gives incentives not to overstep to avoid information-production and 
oversight requirements. The data-development remedial approach 
would also be a stronger deterrent because the impact of the remedy is 
directly internalized by the police organization whereas the 
exclusionary rule’s main impact is to make the job of prosecutors in 
securing a conviction harder. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I analyzes the problematic 
message constitutional criminal procedure sends to police about 
playing fast, hard, and aggressively and the difficulty with doctrinal 
ambiguity and ambivalence about the line between fair and foul play. 
Part II analyzes how constitutional criminal procedure tries to 
calibrate a balance between police power and liberty through rules 
impeding police efficiency, leading to further pressure to game the 
rules. Part III lays the foundation for confronting and addressing 
problematic police gaming by defining the line between fair and foul 
play and offering a taxonomy of the three main modes of problematic 
police gaming. Parts IV and V argue that the time is right for 
reorienting constitutional criminal procedure in this period of foment 
to address the police gamesmanship problem through anti-gaming 
standards and data-development remedial rules. 
 
 35 See infra Part V. 
 36 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (quoting People v. 
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)) (extending good-faith exception in cases of 
negligent police error because “criminal should not go free because the constable has 
blundered”); see also, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (holding that suppression of evidence is “last resort, not the 
first impulse” because exclusionary rule exacts “substantial social costs” in 
undermining truth-seeking and “setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large”). 
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I. THE INCENTIVE TO PLAY AGGRESSIVELY AND COVERTLY 
Police officers are no ordinary audience for the law — they are at 
once a prime and a cautionary example for those who wish to believe 
law matters and can steer behavior. Officers are versed in the law from 
training, experience, and close interaction with prosecutors.37 They are 
capable of very smart, strategic ploys and plays with the law, such as 
using complex lures to sidestep jurisdictional roadblocks to getting 
suspects,38 or playing upon the tangle of exceptions in criminal 
procedure rules to arrest someone for a misdemeanor traffic offense to 
trigger the power to search incident to arrest and discover evidence of 
a larger offense.39 They are sensitive to shifts in the law — even subtle 
and less publicized decision rule shifts that limit remedies for 
constitutional violations — and can adjust behavior accordingly.40 
Clearly, the police are smart enough to think in complex ways about 
criminal procedure doctrine. Yet, as the Supreme Court has remarked 
with some dismay, “[t]he point” of key constitutional norms like the 
Fourth Amendment — the deeper value and spirit embedded in 
constitutional norms regulating the police — “often is not grasped by 
zealous officers.”41 While this is to be deplored, police are not wholly 
to blame. The doctrine and the polity send police mixed messages 
because of a fundamental ambivalence about how we want our police 
to behave. 
A. The Competitive Enterprise of Ferreting Out Crime 
The recurring imagery of the police officer in constitutional criminal 
procedure cases is a zealous, aggressive actor engaged in the 
 
 37 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 754, 778-86 (2003) (describing close 
interactions between prosecutors and agents); Steiker, supra note 21, at 2535 
(explaining that police are educated actors about both conduct and decision rules 
from experience getting training, evidence suppressed, and interaction with 
prosecutors); Training Materials, POLICE LAW INST. http://www.policelaw.org/products/ 
monthly-legal-review.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010) (giving police monthly legal 
updates and online lessons). 
 38 E.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other 
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 39 E.g., Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1601-02 (2008); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 
532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (per curiam). 
 40 Steiker, supra note 21, at 2469, 2533-34, 2543. 
 41 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614 
(1961). 
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“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”42 The imagery of police 
as bent on securing convictions and sparring with the criminal is often 
offered as a contrast to other criminal justice actors, such as the 
detached neutral judicial officer,43 parole officer,44 and even legislator 
— despite the strong self-interest politicians have in looking tough on 
crime.45 Professor David Sklansky has noted wryly that the conception 
of officers as engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime” is so recurrent in criminal procedure doctrine that “one begins 
to suspect it was, at least at times, a diplomatic way to address worries 
beyond an excess of zeal.”46 The imagery may express caution and 
concern for overzealous trampling — and indeed it is often marshaled 
as an explanation for the default constitutional preference for a 
warrant issued by a detached, neutral magistrate judge to double-
check police judgment.47 The imagery also conveys a particular social 
vision of the role of the police.  
Criminal procedure doctrine envisions police playing the angles fast 
and hard and pushing the rules.48 Indeed arguments over which rule 
to adopt are often influenced by background debates over how police 
will game the rules — for example, by using entry into the home to 
effect an arrest as a pretext to search the home without a warrant and 
seize items in plain view49 or arrest suspects for minor traffic offenses 
and leave them unsecured to be able to conduct a search without 
probable cause or warrant.50  
There is a sense in our polity and in our constitutional doctrine that 
to fight criminals who play dirty, police may have to respond with 
 
 42 E.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 
(1987); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.  
 43 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). 
 44 Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998). 
 45 Krull, 480 U.S. at 351. 
 46 David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1734 (2005).  
 47 E.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 717; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. 
 48 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (ruling that even “highly 
inappropriate” deliberate deception of attorney trying to reach her client during 
interrogation does not vitiate validity of waiver of Miranda rights); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (pointing out that difference in scope of search 
between officers executing arrest warrant versus search warrant “may be more 
theoretical than real, however,” in part because police sometimes “ignore the 
restrictions on searches incident to arrest”).  
 49 See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 618 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing, contra the 
majority, that “[a] rule permitting warrantless arrest entries would not pose a danger 
that officers would use their entry power as a pretext to justify an otherwise invalid 
warrantless search”). 
 50 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724-25 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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similar willingness to get muddy.51 For example, because organized 
crime suspects cover their tracks and insulate themselves from 
detection using those lower in the criminal hierarchy to do the risky, 
dirty work, police regularly “flip” criminal informants — threaten 
criminal associates into cooperating in an investigation — to unearth 
evidence.52 Writing for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson has called the 
“use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends” and similar 
betrayals a “dirty business,”53 but it is regular business for the police, 
and the Court has recognized the need for police to play dirty in this 
way to ferret out crime.54 To take another example, if criminals hide 
out in jurisdictions where extradition is difficult, impossible, or just 
plain too slow for law enforcement, U.S. authorities have engaged in 
elaborate ruses to lure defendants to international waters or a friendly 
third country — or occasionally engaged in outright kidnapping — 
sometimes to the ire of other nations.55 Criminal procedure doctrine 
thus envisions the cop as a cunning, aggressive player who “will push 
to the limit.”56  
While the doctrine contemplates that police will play dirty in some 
very sophisticated ways that require substantial thought, the doctrine 
repeatedly declines to ask officers to think too much about the point 
of the rules. The repeated refrain is that police must be shielded from 
the burden of too much thinking in the rough-and-tumble field.57 
 
 51 See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 212 (1964) (White J., 
dissenting) (critiquing unreality of reading Constitution to guarantee “sporting 
treatment for sporting peddlers of narcotics”). 
 52 See, e.g., Philip B. Heyman, Understanding Criminal Investigations, 22 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 315, 323-27 (1985) (explaining challenges of investigating organized crime 
situations where witnesses are unwilling and organizational loyalty insulates higher-
level criminals and need to resort to informants). 
 53 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952).  
 54 See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 203-04 (1909) (cautioning 
that testimony of felon and confessed accomplice should be viewed with great caution, 
but “[n]o reflection is intended or intimated with regard to this action [stooping to 
use an accomplice]” because without such evidence, “it would have been difficult, if 
not impossible, to convict the defendant”). 
 55 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992); United 
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Cybercrime Havens, 17 
BUS. LAW TODAY, 49 (2007) (describing FBI sting luring Russian hackers to United 
States with offer of interview with made-up computer security company “Invita”). 
 56 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 57 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001) (declining 
to provide remedy because “the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur 
(and in the heat) of the moment” and “clear and simple” rules were required); see also, 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as 
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Professor Albert Alschuler has humorously depicted the imagery of the 
officer that emerges from the doctrine as a dim-witted Incredible 
Hulk.58 Unlike the burnished image of the prosecutor entrusted to “do 
justice”59 — and figure out what it means to “do justice” — the police 
officer is treated as a dumb jock of sorts, to deploy another colloquial 
image in wide circulation. The imagery matters because it is the 
conceptual framework on which the law is draped and shaped, 
structuring how we approach problems.60  
B. The Murky Line Between Fair and Foul Play 
The line between fair and foul play when police push and play with 
the rules is indistinct. Is it clever strategy or unfair gaming when 
police play on the doctrinal element of “standing” — which permits a 
remedy only for the individual whose rights were violated — and 
illegally search one person to get evidence against a suspect knowing 
the suspect lacks standing to exclude the evidence?61 Is it creative, 
commendable police work or improper gaming when police lure a 
criminal hiding abroad to open waters or a third country that will 
extradite?62 We have a deep ambivalence when it comes to 
 
the one confronting these officers . . . spontaneity rather than adherence to a police 
manual is necessarily the order of the day” and in such situation officers “act out of a 
host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives”). 
 58 Alschuler, supra note 28, at 286. 
 59 E.g., United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 166 n.16 (3d Cir. 2005) (en 
banc); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (explaining that prosecutor represents impartial 
sovereignty whose interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done”). 
 60 The rich literature on the power of metaphors in law is instructive. See, e.g., 
JACK M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 247 (1998) 
(“[M]etaphoric models selectively describe a situation, and in so doing help to 
suppress alternative conceptions.”); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE 
LIVE BY 145-46 (1980) (explaining that metaphors are conceptual structures that help 
shape how we understand and process reality); ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND 
REASON 25 (2008) (explaining import of metaphors in propagating constitutional 
norms); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2001) (explaining that metaphors 
are “are part of our conceptual systems and affect the way we interpret our 
experiences”).  
 61 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (involving such tactic).  
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.D.C.) rev’d on other 
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (offering account of how U.S. authorities 
concocted elaborate scheme to lure suspected hijacker in Cyprus to international 
waters, where he could be arrested); Brenner & Schwerha IV, supra note 55, at 49 
(describing sting luring Russian hackers to United States with offer of interview with 
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conceptualizing which strategies are deemed “fair” and what “fair” 
should mean for police because of a sense that criminals should be 
brought to justice, not given a “sporting chance.”63 We fear what Judge 
Learned Hand termed “the archaic formalism and the watery 
sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of 
crime.”64  
The competing view that police should play fair and not just play to 
win — and that we should have a robust conception of what it means 
to “play fair” — is founded on the belief that much more is at stake in 
ensuring adherence to fair rules of play than a sporting chance for 
criminals. The deeper value served by ensuring fair play is a safeguard 
against the police asserting a power that overrides the norms and 
values of a free society under the mistaken logic that the ends justify 
any means.65 Taken individually, each rule may not appear to be the 
 
“Invita” made-up computer security company). Norms on this practice are contested 
within and among countries but the United States treats luring as an acceptable and 
sometimes necessary law enforcement tool. U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-15.630 
(1997) (regularizing procedures for luring suspects); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The 
Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive 
Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 813, 870-76 (1993) (offering accounts of 
diplomatic protest when U.S. officials bypassed extradition procedures); David P. 
Warner, Challenges to International Law Enforcement Cooperation for the United States 
in the Middle East and North Africa: Extradition and Its Alternatives, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
479, 501 (2005) (contrasting legitimacy in United States with potential for objections 
by other nations). 
 63 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in BENTHAMIANA OR 
SELECT EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 286 (John Hill Burton ed., 2007) 
(1843) (mocking notion of “the idea of fairness, in the sense in which the word is used 
by sportsmen” such as fox hunters who give fox fair chance to escape); Rollin M. 
Perkins, The Great American Game: Our Sporting Theory of Criminal Justice, HARPER’S 
MAG., Nov. 1927, at 750, 755-56 (deploring letting criminals go free because of 
overemphasis on technical rules of game rather than substance of guilt or innocence); 
A.T.H. Smith, The Right to Silence in Cases of Serious Fraud, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE & 
HUMAN RIGHTS VOL. 1, at 86 (Peter Birks. ed., 1995) (deploring notion); see also Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Court 
for punishing “the public for the mistakes and misdeeds of law enforcement officers” 
and “regress[ing] to playing a grisly game of ‘hide and seek’ ” under “sporting theory of 
criminal justice”); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 213 (1964) (“Law 
enforcement may have the elements of a contest about it, but it is not a game.”); 
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927) (White, J., dissenting) (“A criminal 
prosecution is more than a game in which the government may be checkmated and the 
game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule.”).  
 64 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).  
 65 See, e.g., Brewer, 430 U.S. at 409 (Marshall, J., concurring) (warning against 
dangers of “declar[ing] that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies 
the means [. . . and] that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal”).  
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indispensable line against a slip into abuse, but collectively, the system 
of rules derived from constitutional norms form a phalanx of 
protection to avert a slide into an ends-overcome-all society in which 
the core of liberty is eroded away.66 Sometimes this may mean a 
setback for police in a particular case, but protecting constitutional 
norms serves a larger collective interest in fairness and fair play.67 
Constitutional criminal procedure has been torn between the 
competing visions and worldviews. A casualty of the conflict is clarity 
about what constitutes fair and unfair play. Clearly constitutional 
protections against police power contemplate that police will not have 
free rein to pursue criminals with utmost vigor and efficiency.68 But 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine must also accommodate 
the sense that routes should be left open for police to investigate 
effectively. Indeed, criminal procedure doctrine takes great pains to 
read the Constitution to leave strategic routes open for the police to 
investigate crime effectively. In the Fourth Amendment context, for 
example, the Court has framed a consent rule that gives police space 
to take advantage of the ignorance of everyday people about their right 
to say no, in the interest of “encouraging consent, for the resulting 
search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution 
of crime.”69 The Court also recently invalidated the approach of lower 
courts considering failure to obtain a warrant before attempting to 
secure entry into a home despite ample probable cause as a factor 
suggesting deliberate manufacture of an exigency to evade the warrant 
requirement as an “unjustifiabl[e] interfere[nce] with legitimate law 
enforcement strategies.”70 
Constitutional criminal procedure doctrine also leaves routes open 
in more subtle ways. For example, by concluding that police use of 
informants and undercover agents wearing a wire does not implicate 
 
 66 Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth?, WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 280 (1963) (deploring public impatience with procedures 
that seem to hamper task of law enforcement explaining their greater import). 
 67 See James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel 
Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1, 
48-49 (1988). 
 68 See James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the 
Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1160 (1992). 
 69 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 256 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 243 (1973); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing Court for trying to enable “the police to capitalize on the ignorance of 
citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only 
on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights”). 
 70 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (May 16, 2011). 
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the Fourth Amendment,71 the Court permits the police to do with 
undercover agents and informants what they cannot with a wiretap 
alone, absent the heightened showing of probable cause and need 
under the Wiretap Act.72 While the Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects against wiretapping without probable cause,73 
and Congress has applied strong protections that exceed the 
constitutional floor against wiretapping, the Court has held that 
information revealed to a third party wearing a wire is not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information revealed to a third party.74 This doctrinal 
accommodation permits the police to tackle the kinds of 
organizational crimes and corruption cases that are difficult to 
penetrate because prime actors are often well insulated.75  
Indeed, the police may go so far as to plant a jailhouse informant to 
elicit information from a suspect and avoid the obligation to administer 
Miranda warnings so long as formal proceedings on the offense of 
inquiry have not been initiated.76 If formal proceedings have 
commenced, triggering applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the Court has struck the balance differently.77 A police-planted 
jailhouse informant or undercover agent may not deliberately elicit 
information from the suspect without an adequate waiver of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel once formal adversarial proceedings have 
commenced.78 Police may, however, plant a jailhouse informant or 
undercover agent to serve as a “listening post” in hopes of hearing 
incriminating statements so long as the jailhouse plant does not take 
action beyond merely listening to incriminating remarks.79 
 
 71 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
 72 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 
Stat. 197 (1968). For informative histories, see, for example JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW 
OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1986); Herman Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic 
Eavesdropping: The Politics of “Law and Order,” 67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969). 
 73 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).  
 74 White, 401 U.S. at 749. 
 75 Cf. Heyman, supra note 51, at 323-27 (explaining challenges of investigating 
organized crime situations and need to resort to informants in context where 
witnesses are unwilling and organizational loyalty insulates higher-level criminals). 
 76 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990).  
 77 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (explaining that Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel initially attaches after first formal charging proceeding).  
 78 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-75 (1980).  
 79 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 
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So police can slide around the rules — sometimes and sometimes 
not. There are few guideposts about the line between fair and foul play 
or even how to conceptualize what it is. Some routes around rules are 
meant to exist — and others are bushwhacked by police unhappy with 
a controversial rule, such as the Miranda requirement. When the 
Court formulates a rule to bind police, aiming with best intentions for 
clarity and concision, rule-pushing by officers can lead to a tangle of 
exceptions that try to accommodate law enforcement practices while 
drawing new lines in the sand.80 As a result, while the steady spate of 
constitutional criminal procedure cases since the 1960s has evolved a 
code of conduct for police, the code has been critiqued as offering 
little comprehensible guidance.81 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has adopted decision-framing rules 
that tend to have courts bowing out of the business of articulating 
what constitutes fair and foul play. One of the most prominent of such 
decision-framing doctrines is the general rule of judicial noninquiry 
into the reasons behind and prevalence of a practice so long as an 
officer can point to an “objective” basis at the time for an exertion of 
power against an individual — even if offered as a post hoc 
rationalization.82 The current stance of criminal procedure doctrine, 
controversially reiterated in the racial profiling case Whren v. United 
States, is that so long as an objective basis can be conceived for a 
particular police action, courts should not inquire or explain the 
bounds of propriety of police conduct further.83  
In the qualified immunity context, moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Pearson v. Callahan further takes the courts out of 
the job of calling fair or foul where police push the rules and game 
 
 80 Thus, as Welsh White has explained, “in many cases, the police precipitate the 
uncertainty” of constitutional criminal procedure “by pushing for exceptions to a rule 
that seems clear” — and if an exception is granted, further police rule-pushing may 
lead to further exceptions and a lack of clarity. Welsh White, Improving Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1995). 
 81 E.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 
37-44 (1993). 
 82 E.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007) (explaining that Court 
repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce subjectivity into Fourth Amendment 
analysis); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004) (holding that objective 
circumstances, rather than subjective police motives or knowledge control analysis of 
reasonableness of arrest); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) 
(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 & n.1, 235 (1973) 
(holding that traffic violation arrest is not invalid even if was “a mere pretext for a 
narcotics search”).  
 83 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
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blind spots, gaps, and ambiguities.84 Pearson suspended the 
requirement of Saucier v. Katz85 that courts considering whether to 
dismiss suits against officers for violations of constitutional rights first 
determine whether the facts as pled make out a constitutional 
violation.86 Saucier required courts to decide if the facts alleged 
amount to a constitutional violation even if not of “clearly established 
law” because law would otherwise stagnate and wrongs persist 
unremedied since without clarification a violation cannot amount to a 
transgression of clearly established law.87 Pearson departed from 
Saucier’s requisite, however, ruling that courts may dismiss suits 
alleging constitutional violations by police on the grounds the conduct 
did not violate clearly established pre-existing law without ever 
explaining whether the conduct was fair or foul — thus leaving both 
police and the public in the dark about what the Constitution has to 
say about such conduct.88 
C. The Implicit Message To Be Covert 
The main message sent by the murky jurisprudence surrounding fair 
and foul rule-pushing is not to be obvious — that is, to game covertly. 
Otherwise the general stance of constitutional criminal procedure is 
not to inquire into police motives so long as an objective basis for an 
exertion of power can be hypothesized. In the criminal procedure 
arena, particularly in Fourth Amendment cases involving police 
regulation, the Supreme Court is particularly unwilling to have 
judicial inquiry into the subjective motivations of officers.89 Our 
attitude towards policing is akin to the common joke regarding 
sausage — we want it, but we do not want to know too much about 
the gritty stuff that goes into it.  
The noninquiry stance is frequently justified based on the 
administrative difficulties and inefficiencies of case-by-case inquiry 
into the mystery of police motives and the need for officers on the 
 
 84 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
 85 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
 86 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816-20. 
 87 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  
 88 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816-20. 
 89 This stance is oft-reiterated. E.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, No. 10-98, 2011 WL 
2119110, at *6-7 (May 31, 2011); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (May 16, 
2011); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 
U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (“Subjective intent alone . . . does not 
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.”). 
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street to make quick ad hoc judgments that courts should not subject 
to second-guessing.90 This noninquiry stance means that potential 
gaming may flourish unaddressed for years so long as post hoc, 
objective bases can be identified for exercises of power and incursions 
into constitutional protections. When the Court does pronounce a 
practice unfair gaming around the rules, the pronouncement typically 
comes ex post and sometimes years after a practice has crystallized.  
In general, the Court appears to be more willing to depart from the 
usual stance of noninquiry into subjective law enforcement intent and 
delve into police motivation further along the investigation timeline 
when suspicion has attached to a particular person.91 We thus have the 
odd result of stronger protections for the more-probably guilty. The 
effect is to have more searching scrutiny into law enforcement 
stratagems under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, which regulate 
further down the investigation and prosecution timeline, than the 
Fourth Amendment, which protects closer to the outset of the 
investigation.92  
Two further things are striking when the Court moves to close off 
unfair gaming: (1) the motive of the officer, which is typically 
irrelevant in criminal procedure, becomes an issue; and (2) the Court 
tends to react in the rare cases where strategic motive to get around a 
constitutional rule is made transparent by an unusually frank law 
enforcement officer. Indeed, in Missouri v. Seibert, which invalidated 
the question-first, Miranda-warnings-later tactic of police 
interrogation, the Court noted “the intent of the officer will rarely be 
as candidly admitted as it was here.”93 Interrogating officer Richard 
Hanrahan frankly revealed that he instructed the arresting officer to 
refrain from giving Miranda warnings to a woman suspected of 
instructing her son to burn down their trailer, killing a mentally 
 
 90 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 91 E.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 618-19 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977); see also Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.7 (1980) (noting relevance of subjective intent in informing 
standard couched in objective terms). 
 92 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” and construed today to be primary regulator of police investigation); U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (providing, inter alia, “nor shall [any person] be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself” and, thus, governing after the 
commencement of a “criminal case”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (prescribing rights that 
apply in “all criminal prosecutions” and, thus, governing after the launch of “criminal 
prosecutions”). 
 93 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6. 
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disabled youth who lived with the family.94 He testified that he had 
been trained in the tactic to elicit confessions and the strategy was 
promoted by his department and other departments at which he had 
worked in the past.95 Some police manuals went so far as to instruct, 
“[t]here is no need to give a Miranda warning before asking questions 
if . . . the answers given . . . will not be required by the prosecutor 
during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.”96 The Seibert plurality 
underscored that the facts revealed “a police strategy adapted to 
undermine the Miranda warnings.”97  
The Court fractured as to how to define and address the problem. A 
four-person plurality opinion authored by Justice David Souter 
adopted an objective approach aimed at assessing whether a 
midstream Miranda warning would function as effectively as Miranda 
required.98 The pivotal fifth vote for the result was supplied by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, however, who focused on the subjective bad faith 
of the officers, terming the forbidden conduct the “deliberate,” 
“calculated,” and “intentional” strategy “to undermine the Miranda 
warning.”99 Such transparent subversion requiring the Court to 
intervene would be infrequent, Justice Kennedy believed.100 
Seibert has been a puzzle for police and lower courts.101 While there 
were five votes for the position that the two-step interrogation 
approach in Seibert’s case was invalid, the test for gauging whether the 
line between the fair and forbidden is transgressed was unclear. Both 
Justice Stephen Breyer, who joined the four-person plurality, and 
Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the result, wrote separate 
opinions.102 Typically the view of the Justice or Justices concurring in 
the judgment on the narrowest grounds controls,103 but which ground 
is the narrowest basis is contestable. 
Justice Kennedy wrote that his approach would apply in the 
infrequent case, suggesting his was the narrowest basis for 
invalidation. But his focus on subjective law enforcement intent 
 
 94 Id. at 616. 
 95 Id. at 609-10. 
 96 ILL. POLICE LAW INST., POLICE LAW MANUAL 83 (Jan. 2001–Dec. 2003), cited in 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 610 n.2 [hereinafter POLICE LAW MANUAL].  
 97 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616. 
 98 Id. at 611-12. 
 99 Id.  
 100 See id. 
 101 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1551 (2008). 
 102 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 103 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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represents the wider shift because it inverts the usual noninquiry rule 
in constitutional criminal procedure and was not accepted by at least 
seven Justices.104 At least six circuits follow Justice Kennedy’s inquiry 
into whether the violation was deliberate, while five circuits use both 
tests, combine parts of both approaches, or decline to decide which 
approach controls.105 The states are also fractured about which 
touchstone of invalidity to use.106 
To take a second example, in Watts v. Indiana, the Court thanked 
the state prosecutor for being forthright in describing the relay-team 
interrogation of a murder suspect.107 For five days the suspect was 
kept in a cell called the “hole” when not being questioned and then re-
questioned by a prosecutor when his first incriminating statements 
were not deemed satisfactory.108 The Court described the procedure as 
“a calculated endeavor to secure a confession through the pressure of 
unrelenting interrogation” and ruled that this “suction process” of 
“[p]rotracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to 
interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting” a confession 
violated the defendant’s due process rights.109 
In a third example, Brewer v. Williams — the paradigmatic case for 
those who worry that fair play rules hinder police in addressing 
serious harms — an Iowan police detective admitted with plainspoken 
candor that he spoke to a defendant without his counsel because he 
wanted to find a little girl that the suspect had kidnapped on 
Christmas Eve.110 The defendant, escaped mental patient Robert 
Anthony Williams, had been spotted carrying a child bundled prone in 
a blanket from the Des Moines YMCA where the girl went missing on 
Christmas Eve.111 Williams surrendered to police on December 26 in 
Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles east of Des Moines.112 Detective Cleatus 
Leaming transported Williams to Des Moines where his lawyer waited 
 
 104 The seven Justices who eschewed a subjective inquiry are the dissenters 
O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas along with the plurality of Souter, Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and potentially Justice Breyer, though his concurrence indicating he agreed 
with Justice Kennedy “insofar as it is consistent . . . and makes clear that a good-faith 
exception applies” has been read as ambiguous by Miranda law expert Charles D. 
Weisselberg. Weisselberg, supra note 101, at 1551 & n.169. 
 105 Id. at 1551 & nn.172, 173. 
 106 Id. at 1551-52 & nn.174, 175. 
 107 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). 
 108 Id. at 53. 
 109 Id. at 53-55. 
 110 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). 
 111 Id. at 390. 
 112 Id. at 390-91. 
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and did not allow Williams’s provisional counsel in Davenport to go 
on the long drive.113 
During the drive, Detective Leaming played on the psychological 
susceptibilities of Williams, who was very religious, by giving what 
was later dubbed the “Christian burial speech.”114 Detective Leaming 
addressed Williams as “Reverend” and talked about the import of 
giving a little girl snatched away from her parents on Christmas Eve a 
Christian burial.115 Swayed during the drive, Williams ultimately 
identified the place where he had left the little girl’s body.116  
Over a vivid dissent by Chief Justice Burger, the Court affirmed the 
reversal of Williams’s conviction. The subjective purpose of Detective 
Leaming was important to the Court’s decision invalidating the end-
run — however well-meaning — around the Sixth Amendment. The 
majority reasoned: “Detective Leaming deliberately and designedly set 
out to elicit information from Williams” and “purposely sought during 
Williams’ isolation from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating 
information as possible.”117 Brewer thus represents another departure 
from the Court’s generally strong default reluctance to inquire into the 
subjective purpose of law enforcement officers. The Court concluded: 
“[d]isinterested zeal for the public good does not assure either wisdom 
or right in the methods it pursues. . . . so clear a violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment as here occurred cannot be condoned.”118 
What are police to glean from the cases in which the Court has 
called a foul? The main message may be not to be too obvious and 
open.119 If police frankly reveal their subjective purpose to sidestep or 
subvert a constitutional protection, then their practice might be shut 
down. This is a troubling message for constitutional criminal 
procedure to send. The perverse incentive is to play fast and hard with 
the rules covertly. More is needed to define and foster police conduct 
that treats the rules as the constitutional norms they are, rather than 
game rules to get around.  
 
 113 Id. at 392-93. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 399. 
 118 Id. at 406. 
 119 Even Chief Justice Burger, one of the most passionate deriders of what he 
termed a “sporting theory of … justice” — penalizing the public for police foul play 
— believed the exclusionary should be applied to “egregious” police conduct. Id. at 
417, 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). His standard of egregiousness was demanding 
indeed, however, with the paradigm case of extortion of confessions by brutality or 
threats. Id. at 423. 
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II. EFFICIENCY-IMPEDING RULES AND REGULATORY PRESSURES  
The regulatory structure of constitutional criminal procedure 
further adds pressure for police to game the rules. Though 
constitutional criminal procedure is about prescribing conduct rules 
for police,120 often constitutional criminal procedure resembles a 
patchwork of pronouncements on the propriety of various police 
methods. For example, we have the law of trash searches,121 the law of 
dog sniffs,122 the law of aerial surveillance,123 and the law of misplaced 
confidence in criminal confidantes124 — which vary depending on 
whether formal proceedings have commenced and the Sixth 
Amendment has attached125 — just to name a few. Jurists and scholars 
frequently critique the lack of consistency in rationales behind the 
patchwork.126 Behind the apparent inconsistency and complexity is an 
overarching regulatory logic that balances police power and civil 
liberties by impeding investigative efficiency.  
 
 120 Steiker, supra note 21, at 2469-70. 
 121 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).  
 122 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 123 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion); California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986).  
 124 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 125 Compare, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1990) (holding that 
police may plant informant and undercover agent to elicit information from suspect in 
custody before the commencement of formal proceedings by indictment or other 
procedural mechanism triggering Sixth Amendment protections), with United States v. 
Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271-73 (1980) (holding that once Sixth Amendment rights 
attach, police may not use informant to deliberately elicit information from suspect in 
custody).  
 126 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1125-26 (1996) (describing constitutional criminal procedure 
doctrine as “a mess” and observing that “United States Reports now swells with 
language bulging this way and that, at virtually every level of generality and 
specificity”); Michael Mello, Is a Puzzlement!: An Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 153 (2008) (“The fifty-four words which comprise the Fourth 
Amendment have generated a jurisprudence which is rich, contradictory, and 
maddening.”); George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1819, 1819 (1997) (book review) (“[T]he law of criminal procedure had 
become encrusted with doctrinal complexities that seemed to bear little or no 
relationship to the underlying constitutional rights.”); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 91, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, the only thing the 
past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, 
those “actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy” “that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable,’ ” . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of 
privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”). 
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Part of constitutional criminal procedure’s unwritten overarching 
logic is use of the costs of pursuing an investigatory method as a 
constraint on the frequency and ubiquity of use. The confusing 
patchwork of pronouncements on whether and how the Fourth 
Amendment regulates particular methods must be seen in light of this 
logic. A prime example where the Court has deployed the logic of 
efficiency-impeding rules and regulation by cost calibration is in the 
context of restraints on electronic surveillance.  
Criminal procedure rules seem to exert a puzzlingly perverse 
incentive for police to use informants or undercover agents as an 
entryway into an investigation despite the high dangers and costs of 
planting an agent or informant. This seemingly perverse incentive, 
however, fits within the logic of regulation through costs-calibration 
and efficiency-impeding. Today, the use of electronic wiretapping is 
subject to both extensive constitutional restrictions as well as statutory 
restrictions under Berger v. United States127 and Title III of the Wiretap 
Act and state-law analogues.128 Berger indicates that before police may 
wiretap, the Fourth Amendment requires particularization of the 
conversations to be seized as well as the particular offense police are 
investigating; limits on length of surveillance; a showing of “present 
probable cause” to continue surveillance; and notice and return listing 
the conversations seized.129 Wiretap law goes further and requires, 
among other things, that police show that “normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”130 This necessity 
requirement reserves electronic surveillance as a last resort. In 
addition, even where police succeed in gaining wiretap authorization, 
they have a duty to man the wire to minimize interception of 
conversations that are not pertinent to the offense being investigated 
under the warrant.131 This imposes additional substantial costs on the 
use of electronic surveillance as an investigative method because the 
minimization requirement means that police on a wiretap must man 
the wire around the clock.  
 
 127 Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 128 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 
Stat. 197 (1968).  
 129 Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59. 
 130 18 U.S.C § 2518(3)(c) (2006). 
 131 18 U.S.C § 2518(5) (“Every order and extension thereof shall contain a 
provision that the . . . [electronic surveillance] shall be conducted in such a way as to 
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception 
under this chapter.”). 
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The rationale for these additional strictures is the grave threat posed 
to liberty by electronic surveillance methods such as wiretapping, 
which is swifter and less expensive to police than other methods and 
has the potential to be pervasive if unregulated. The Berger Court 
reasoned, for example, that “[f]ew threats to liberty exist which are 
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices” and 
noted that electronic eavesdropping is “quicker, easier, and more 
certain” than other methods.132 Before the landmark decision of Katz v. 
United States in 1967,133 wiretaps and similar methods of surveillance 
accomplished without physical penetration of a protected space were 
deemed outside the scope of Fourth Amendment regulation, which 
was construed to prohibit trespass into protected areas.134 In Katz, the 
Supreme Court brought wiretapping into the sphere of Fourth 
Amendment regulation through a paradigm shift in the definition of 
what the Fourth Amendment protects from physical trespass to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test familiar today.135 Summarizing 
the evolution of standards, Justice William Douglas explained in a 
dissent that “[t]he threads of thought running through our recent 
decisions are that these extensive intrusions into privacy made by 
electronic surveillance make self-restraint by law enforcement officials 
an inadequate protection, that the requirement of warrants under the 
Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society.”136  
In contrast, the Constitution leaves unregulated the use of 
informants and undercover agents because the Supreme Court has 
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
confided to a third party, particularly a criminal confederate.137 To 
gain entryway into an investigation and probable cause for subsequent 
searches or wiretap authorizations, therefore, police resort to 
 
 132 Berger, 388 U.S. at 63. 
 133 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 134 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to use of detectaphone to eavesdrop on 
conversation because there was no physical trespass); Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 457, 464-66 (1928) (applying trespass rationale and holding Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to wiretap on phone line without physical intrusion into 
protected area). 
 135 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (turning away from trespass rationale); see also id. at 
360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”). 
 136 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 137 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
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cultivating informants or planting undercover agents, particularly in 
proactive investigations where higher-ups in a criminal organization 
or activity are well shielded from sight.138 Being an informant or 
undercover agent is very dangerous, and tragic stories of undercover 
investigations gone wrong and informants or agents killed are all too 
frequent.139 The method takes substantial investment in human capital 
with greater risks and lower probability of success. Sometimes it may 
take years to cultivate sufficient trust to infiltrate a criminal 
organization, and the attempt may founder. The very costs of the 
enterprise impose a check on the frequency and pervasiveness of use 
of the tactic. Hence, while it may seem perverse indeed to channel 
police toward a method that is dangerous and expensive, the very high 
costs, risks, and uncertainty of success have a calibrating effect in 
curtailing the frequency of use, reserving the method for situations 
where the benefits are worth the costs.  
To take a second example, the unwritten logic of regulation by 
efficiency-impeding also helps explain the puzzling contrast between 
the Court’s holdings in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond140 and Illinois v. 
Lidster.141 In Edmond, the Supreme Court invalidated a drug 
interdiction checkpoint, which subjected people to brief investigative 
seizures without reasonable articulable suspicion.142 Edmond 
distinguished Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, which 
permitted brief suspicionless stops at sobriety checkpoints,143 because 
the programmatic purpose of the drug interdiction checkpoint was 
ordinary criminal law enforcement that requires individualized 
suspicion rather than special needs such as traffic safety.144 Lidster 
involved suspicionless stops at a checkpoint in the service of criminal 
law enforcement — the investigation of a hit and run killing.145 
Because Lidster involved criminal law enforcement rather than a 
special needs search, the checkpoint seemed destined for invalidation 
 
 138 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 51, at 323-27 (discussing need for informants and 
undercover agents). 
 139 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (describing torture 
and murder of undercover DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena); Andrea L. Dennis, 
Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches as Collateral Damage in America’s “War” on Drugs, 
Crime and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1152-53 (2009) (collecting accounts of 
youthful informants who were murdered). 
 140 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000). 
 141 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004). 
 142 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
 143 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990). 
 144 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41. 
 145 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422. 
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under Edmond. But the Court in Lidster upheld the suspicionless stops. 
The Court attempted to explain the puzzle pragmatically, noting that 
the concept of reasonable suspicion did not fit the context of 
information-gathering investigative stops.146 This does not explain the 
collapse of the Court’s prior distinction between special needs 
searches and suspicionless stops for ordinary criminal law 
enforcement, however. More revealing is the Court’s observation, “we 
do not believe that an Edmond-type rule is needed to prevent an 
unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints” because “limited 
police resources and community hostility to related traffic tie-ups 
seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation.”147 Because there were 
cost constraints on the tactic external to criminal procedure rules, 
courts need not intervene to heighten the costs or prohibit the practice 
to preserve the balance of police power and liberty.  
The logic of regulation by raising the costs of a tactic is also 
generally evident in more quotidian criminal procedure contexts and 
baseline rules, such as the default requirement of a warrant issued in 
advance of action by a magistrate judge before a search. In a reality 
where police can forum-shop magistrate judges and where assembly-
line criminal justice precludes searching review of affidavits, 
commentators have wondered why criminal procedure is so insistent 
on the warrant requirement.148 Part of the answer is that the 
requirement that police go through the paperwork hassle of producing 
an affidavit and getting a magistrate judge to sign off on a warrant 
imposes costs before a search. Raising the costs by impeding efficiency 
gives police incentive against indiscriminate intrusion because the 
anticipated benefits need to be worth the costs.  
A similar logic also helps explain the Court’s decision in Knowles v. 
Iowa that police must actually arrest before they engage in a search 
 
 146 See id. at 425. 
 147 Id. at 426. 
 148 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 881, 888-89 (1991) (critiquing “slapdash” nature of warrant review process, 
debunking common rationales supporting warrant regime, and noting warrants “must 
be a far worse way of adjudicating the legality of police conduct than after-the-fact 
adversary litigation”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 33-35 (1988) (critiquing default 
warrant requirement as procedural check noting that rule is “so riddled with 
exceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for the 
unwary”). But see Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the 
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1464-79 (2010) (noting deleterious consequences of shift away 
from warrant requirement toward ex post reasonableness review).  
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incident to arrest of an automobile.149 Knowles held that police cannot 
just issue a citation in lieu of arrest and then claim the power to search 
incident to arrest.150 The requirement that the police go through the 
trouble of an arrest raises the costs of an intrusive search, forcing 
deliberation and restraint to focus on cases where potential benefits 
are worth the costs.  
Regulation by impeding efficiency has pragmatic appeal, but it also 
leads to great strain on the superstructure of the rules. Cost-raising 
protections such as the requirement of a warrant seem like pesky 
“formalities” or inefficient roadblocks that impede investigation, 
heightening temptation to circumvent or sidestep the requisites. For 
example, police who track suspected drug traffickers to a warehouse 
may be tempted to take a peek into the warehouse after the traffickers 
have left to see if there are drugs inside before going to the bother of 
writing an affidavit and getting a search warrant.151 Prohibitions on 
searching the automobile of a suspect arrested for a minor traffic 
offense and secured may lead to roadside searches recharacterized as 
“inventory searches.”152 It is little wonder that constitutional criminal 
procedure doctrine resembles the complex cracks and fissures in a 
series of dams under immense pressure because it is channeling police 
power up the hill of costs, away from the most expedient routes. 
Unless standards of fair play steer police judgment, redefining natural 
patterns of decisionmaking beyond the most expedient routes, the 
continued pressure will further aggravate and proliferate the 
complexity of constitutional criminal procedure and its web of 
stopgap plugs and new fissures. 
III. A TAXONOMY OF POLICE GAMESMANSHIP MANEUVERS 
A necessary step toward ameliorating the police gamesmanship 
dilemma is understanding the line between fair and foul play and the 
structure of problematic police gamesmanship. We cannot expect 
police to play fair if we do not define the meaning of playing fair. This 
Part delineates a rule of thumb to discern problematic gaming and 
then offers a taxonomy of problematic police gaming.  
 
 149 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1998).  
 150 Id. at 118-19. 
 151 Cf. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539-40 (1988) (involving case where 
agents first entered suspected drop house to confirm there were drugs inside before 
then getting warrant). 
 152 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368-69, 374 (1987) (affirming roadside 
search of automobile before tow truck arrived to impound vehicle as inventory search 
following arrest for driving under influence).  
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A. Discerning Problematic Gaming 
While the question of the line between fair and forbidden gaming is 
murky, we can get bearings from Missouri v. Seibert.153 The plurality 
invalidated the questions-first police tactic because “by any objective 
measure” the conduct revealed “a police strategy adapted to 
undermine the Miranda warnings.”154 Justice Kennedy, who supplied 
the fifth vote, also found strategic subversion to be the problem — 
albeit defined based on subjective intent rather than objective 
assessment of conduct.155 In short, subversion of the purpose of a 
constitutional protection should be deemed foul play.  
The harder question is whether such subversion is defined in terms 
of subjective intent. The answer appears to be no. A comfortable 
majority of Justices appeared to reject inquiry into subjective intent. 
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Souter and joined by 
Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted 
that “[b]ecause the intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly 
admitted as it was” in Seibert, the focus should be “on facts apart from 
intent that show the question-first tactic at work.”156 The dissent of 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by then-Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, agreed with the 
plurality insofar as it “declines to focus its analysis on the subjective 
intent of the interrogating officer.”157 Justice O’Connor reasoned that 
officer intent, unknown to the suspect, can have no bearing on 
whether she knowingly or voluntarily waived her rights and would 
send courts on a fruitless, inefficient expedition into the minds of 
police officers that constitutional criminal procedure “all but 
uniformly” avoids.158 While Seibert involved “the uncommonly 
straightforward circumstance of an officer openly admitting that the 
violation was intentional,” in most cases, intent is opaque.159 
The reluctance of the majority of Justices to hinge analysis on 
subjective intent is salutary. An intent-based definition of problematic 
police gaming would aggravate the perverse message to game covertly 
because only in the infrequent case where officers openly reveal intent 
to undermine protections would an intent-based definition discern 
 
 153 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 154 Id. at 614-17 (2004). 
 155 Id. at 621 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (considering tactic invalid because it was 
calculated to undermine Miranda warning). 
 156 Id. at 617 n.6. 
 157 Id. at 622-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 158 Id. at 625-26. 
 159 Id. at 626. 
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problematic gaming. The plurality position of relying on objective 
indicia of conduct that undermines the purpose and effect of 
protections apart from subjective intent is the better way to discern 
problematic police gaming. 
Of course, where intent to undermine a protection is admitted, then 
we have a slam-dunk case of problematic gaming and such evidence, if 
available, is potent. The more frequent situation, however, calls for 
examining the police conduct to determine if it subverts the substance 
of a protection. This will avoid costly and often fruitless inquiry into 
subjective intent and mitigate the perverse incentive to shade the truth 
in police testimony about intent.160  
How does this yardstick discern problematic gamesmanship? To 
illustrate, it is helpful to begin with an example of what does not fall 
within the subversion-of-purpose-definition. Illinois v. Perkins161 offers 
an example. In Perkins, police put an informant and undercover agent 
in a cell with defendant Perkins to elicit incriminating statements 
about an unsolved murder with which Perkins had not been 
charged.162 Perkins was in jail on unrelated charges of aggravated 
assault.163 The question was whether Miranda’s Fifth Amendment 
protections in the context of custodial interrogation were violated by 
the elicitation of information.164  
The Court held that Miranda’s protections were not implicated 
because the purpose of Miranda was to mitigate the coerciveness and 
compulsion produced by a “police-dominated atmosphere” that are 
“not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone 
whom he believes to be a fellow inmate.”165 Coerciveness is considered 
from the suspect’s perspective. When a suspect thinks he is boasting 
among fellow prisoners, the concern about coerciveness is not 
present.166 The police maneuvering did not subvert Miranda’s purpose 
because “Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by 
taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to 
 
 160 For an informative exploration of the phenomenon of “testilying,” see generally 
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996) (exploring phenomenon and reasons). 
 161 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1990). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Because charges had not been filed against him on the murder, no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel had attached with regard to questioning about the 
murder. Id. at 296, 299. 
 165 Id. at 295-96; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (detailing 
reasons for its procedural safeguards). 
 166 Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-97. 
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be a fellow prisoner.”167 The strategy was within fair bounds because it 
did not undermine the purpose of the Miranda protections.168  
If we take subversion of the spirit or purpose of a rule as the 
yardstick for problematic police gaming, we can build a framework to 
understand the kinds of games police play that should concern us. The 
next sections present a taxonomy of problematic police gaming 
organized around an expanded notion of the distinction between 
conduct and decision rules developed by Professors Carol Steiker and 
Meir Dan-Cohen from Jeremy Bentham’s work.169 There are three main 
forms of problematic police gamesmanship: conduct rule gaming, 
remedial rule gaming, and framing rule gaming. For each of the three 
forms, three illustrative examples are examined to render the theory 
concrete. 
B. Conduct Rule Gaming 
While in the criminal law context, conduct rules tell the public how 
to behave, in the context of criminal procedure — “criminal law for 
cops” — conduct rules tell the police how to behave.170 Using 
subversion of the purpose of a conduct rule as the touchstone, this 
section looks at three examples of conduct rule gaming: (1) going 
through the motions while subverting the substance of a conduct rule, 
(2) stacking disparate exceptions to default constitutional protections 
to exceed the purpose of the exceptions, and (3) the use of proxy 
actors or jurisdictional gradients in the scope of protections to sidestep 
constitutional conduct rules for police. 
1. Going through the Motions, Subverting the Purpose 
The two-step interrogation tactic at issue in Missouri v. Seibert 
exemplifies gaming by observing a rule while undermining its 
purpose. Like many true-life crime stories, the facts of Seibert read like 
a gritty contemporary tragedy. After her twelve-year-old son Jonathan, 
who had cerebral palsy, died in his sleep, Patrice Seibert feared neglect 
charges because of bedsores on his body.171 Apparently to hide the 
body, Seibert’s surviving son Darian and his friends, in her presence, 
concocted a sorely misguided plan to burn the body in her trailer 
together with a mentally ill teenager named Donald so that it would 
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not appear Jonathan died unattended.172 In the blaze, Donald burned 
to death, while Darian sustained burn injuries.173 
Interrogating Officer Richard Hanrahan directed the arresting officer 
not to administer Miranda rights to Seibert.174 He then elicited 
incriminating statements from Seibert, getting her to admit she knew 
that Donald was to die in the trailer fire.175 Only after obtaining 
incriminating statements did Officer Hanrahan turn on the tape 
recorder and administer a Miranda advisal.176 After Seibert waived her 
Miranda rights, Officer Hanrahan led her through the incriminating 
statements again, prodding her with her prior statements when she 
was reluctant to admit her knowledge regarding the killing.177  
While police strategy is often opaque, and the stance of the courts is 
generally not to pry, the two-step tactic surfaced more clearly than 
usual in part because Seibert was a rare case of openly revealed 
strategic intent.178 As the Seibert plurality opinion underscored, 
however, even if one simply examines objective conduct and puts 
aside the information on subjective police intent, it was plain from the 
conduct that the officer was just going through the motions of 
Miranda’s conduct rule through a strategy “dedicated to draining the 
substance out of Miranda.”179 
Patently, the practice was aimed at breaking down and boxing in the 
unwarned defendant, subverting the purpose of Miranda. Once the 
suspect admits the crime, he “would hardly think he had a genuine 
right to remain silent” — particularly when led over the same ground 
again — and would probably just be perplexed and bewildered as to 
why the officer was going through the motions of incanting about 
rights at that point.180 The Court shut down the practice, with the 
plurality concluding: 
Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda 
cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson 
held Congress could not do by statute. Because the question-
first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of 
reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted, 
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and because the facts here do not reasonably support a 
conclusion that the warnings given could have served their 
purpose, Seibert’s postwarning statements are inadmissible.181 
The touchstone of problematic gamesmanship was thus a strategy that 
thwarted the purpose of a constitutional protection. Going through 
the motions of observing a conduct rule, in this case, an advisal before 
eliciting statements to be used against the defendant, was not enough. 
Gamesmanship goes out of bounds where a police stratagem disables 
the efficacy of the protection. 
2. Exception-Stacking and Rationale-Overriding 
While Seibert’s questions-first tactic offers a patent case of conduct 
rule gaming, identifying unfair conduct rule gaming in other contexts 
can be more complicated. Because criminal procedure is riddled with 
exceptions that offer various routes around default protections, such 
as the myriad exceptions to the default Fourth Amendment rule that a 
warrant and probable cause are required for a search,182 it may be hard 
to discern whether police stacking of exceptions to reach a certain goal 
is fair or foul gaming. The main touchstone should be whether officers 
arrogate to themselves a power that exceeds the scope of the rationale 
for exceptions to the default constitutional protection, thereby 
disfiguring the exceptions beyond their purpose.  
In distinguishing between fair and foul play, it is helpful to begin 
with an example of acceptable exception-stacking. An example of 
acceptable “laddering up” of exceptions to the default Fourth 
Amendment requirement of probable cause and a warrant for a search 
is a familiar daily practice: police officers pull someone over based on 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, and based on observations 
of what is in plain view, build probable cause for an automobile search 
under the automobile exception.183 In these cases, each step of the 
way, the officers stayed within the scope of the rationales of the 
exceptions.  
 
 181 Id. at 617. 
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Consider a harder case using the following tactic: Officers tail an 
individual in traffic until the individual slips up — perhaps out of 
nervousness — and commits a traffic infraction. Officers then stop the 
individual for the traffic infraction and smell a heavy odor of 
marijuana that gives them probable cause to arrest the individual and 
search the car. In this case, we are still not in the zone of problematic 
gaming. Officers have stacked the exceptions. They may even have had 
the subjective intent to tail someone until she slipped up in hopes of 
seeing something in plain view or smelling something in plain sniff. 
Each step of the way, however, officers have not overstepped their 
power and transgressed the purpose of any constitutional protection. 
Officers are free to follow anyone in public so long as they do not stop 
and seize them. There is no constitutional protection against having 
police follow you when you are out and about in public. Officers have 
the power to detain you temporarily when you commit a traffic 
infraction. And officers may use what is in plain view or sniff as a basis 
to seize illegal contraband and arrest. The rationale of the plain view 
or plain smell exception was not exceeded by the tactic. The plain 
view rule is predicated simply on the notion that police have not 
invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy where they perceive 
contraband in the open, from a lawful vantage point.184 The Court has 
explained that the plain view exception applies even when an officer 
went to a suspect’s home with the admitted intent and hope of seeing 
items outside the scope of a search warrant in plain view.185 There has 
not been a transgression of the logic of the exceptions to default 
protections by such conduct.  
So what would be exception-stacking that exceeds the rationale for 
exceptions and crosses the line into problematic gaming of criminal 
procedure’s complex of rules? Arizona v. Gant186 offers two potential 
examples and an illustration of how the Court has struggled to deal 
with the problem of police gaming. The two forms of potential 
conduct rule gaming that Gant addressed are: (1) searches incident to 
arrest that exceed the rationale and purpose of the exception and (2) 
leveraging the power to arrest for minor traffic offenses to ratchet up 
the power to search vehicle compartments and containers within 
incident to arrest. 
First some background. The oft-reiterated baseline default rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure is that police need a warrant and 
probable cause to search. There are many exceptions to this rule — 
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including the power to search items within a suspect’s grab area 
incident to arrest to avert destruction of evidence or danger to 
officers.187 The standard regulating searches incident to arrest was 
famously framed in Chimel v. California, after much doctrinal 
instability.188 The key case extending Chimel to searches of vehicles 
after arrests of recent occupants was New York v. Belton in 1981.189 
Observing that the lower courts had split and foundered in defining 
what constituted the “immediate grab area” of an arrestee in the 
vehicle context, the Belton Court attempted to fashion a guideline. The 
Belton Court founded its rule of police power on an assumption — 
“the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass 
of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, 
even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might 
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].’ ”190 Based on 
this generalization, Belton held that “when a policeman has made a 
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile” as well as containers inside the 
vehicle.191  
Belton was ambiguous in its grant of police power. Some lower 
courts — and belatedly, the Supreme Court — would explain that 
Belton merely held that “when the passenger compartment was within 
an arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that 
the entire compartment and any containers therein may be 
reached.”192 In other words, the exception was still moored to its 
rationale of averting destruction of evidence or danger to the police.  
In the face of the ambiguity, however, police pushed the rule. Police 
began regarding the exception as an automatic power even when the 
rationales justifying the exception were not present. In numerous 
cases, officers searched incident to arrest though a suspect was cuffed 
in the back of a patrol vehicle — or even after the suspect had been 
transported from the scene.193 The majority of lower courts, weighing 
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in after evidence was found, began reading Belton broadly to permit a 
vehicle search incident to arrest of a recent occupant even if there was 
no possibility that the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle and 
items inside at time of the search.194 The practice was so widespread 
that Justice O’Connor observed that “lower court decisions seem now 
to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified 
by the twin rationales of Chimel,” that is, limited to averting danger to 
officers or risk of destruction of evidence.195 
Police and the lower courts had reason for confusion. Doctrinal 
ambivalence about police rule-pushing manifested in Thornton v. 
United States, which seemed amenable to aggressive play outside of 
Chimel’s rationales.196 In Thornton, the Court approved a search 
incident to arrest of a vehicle compartment where a suspect was no 
longer in the car when stopped and was handcuffed in the back of a 
patrol car, posing no risk of harm to officers or destruction of 
evidence.197  
While Thornton seemed to accept police rule-pushing, its regime 
would be relatively short-lived. The seeds were planted even in the 
Thornton concurrences, most notably in the concurrence of Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Scalia pointed out the 
obvious falsity of the empirical assumption that undergirded Belton’s 
rule of automatic power to search: 
If it was ever true that the passenger compartment is “in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably,” within the arrestee’s 
immediate control at the time of the search, it certainly is not 
true today. As one judge has put it: “[I]n our search for clarity, 
we have now abandoned our constitutional moorings and 
floated to a place where the law approves of purely exploratory 
searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite 
objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage 
around in a car to see what they might find.”198 
Just when it seemed that the power to search automobiles incident to 
arrest was mushrooming away from the twin Chimel rationales for the 
exception, the Court decided Arizona v. Gant in 2009.199 In Gant, the 
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Court partially blocked police conduct exceeding the twin rationales of 
Chimel, noting that Belton had underscored that its ruling “in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case 
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial 
arrests.”200 Gant ruled that police may “search a vehicle incident to a 
recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”201 A form of problematic police gamesmanship exceeding the 
purpose of the search-incident-to-arrest rationale was thus shut down.  
Gant also had a second component that partially accommodated the 
rule-pushing practice that had crystallized in the twenty-eight years 
between Belton and Gant. Even where the suspect is secured, Gant 
permitted searches of an automobile and containers within the general 
interest of evidence-gathering “when it is reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.”202 The Court thus preserved and recharacterized Thornton — 
because Thornton, a recent occupant of a vehicle, was arrested for 
illegal narcotics possession after officers found narcotics on his 
person, it was reasonable to believe he might have stashed narcotics in 
the car he had recently exited and therefore the search was valid.203 
What bears underscoring about the second part of Gant’s standard is 
the limitation of the power to search incident to arrest to the crime of 
arrest. The second part of the Gant rule illustrates how the Court also 
adopted an anti-gaming component in its standard to avert another 
form of problematic police gamesmanship that arises at the confluence 
of the power to arrest for even minor traffic offenses and the power to 
search incident to arrest. To understand the other potential form of 
problematic police gamesmanship Gant tried to block, we must 
consider Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,204 which had roused the Court’s 
concern.  
Atwater involved a mother named Gail Atwater, who was driving her 
three-year-old son and five-year-old daughter in her pickup truck in 
Texas and her encounter with an officer named Bart Turek.205 Turek 
had previously stopped Atwater on the mistaken belief he had spotted 
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her son riding without a seatbelt in violation of Texas traffic law.206 On 
the prior occasion, it turned out Atwater’s son was actually wearing a 
seatbelt.207 When Turek spotted Atwater driving with her children in 
the front seat — this time without seatbelts — he acted in apparent 
vindication and vindictiveness.208 According to Atwater, Turek yelled 
something to the effect that “we’ve met before” and “you’re going to 
jail.”209  
He asked to see Atwater’s driver’s license and insurance 
documentation, which she did not have with her because her purse 
had been stolen the day before.210 Atwater asked to take her scared and 
crying children to a nearby friend’s house, but Turek told her, “you’re 
not going anywhere.”211 Though it was uncontested that Atwater “was 
a known and established resident of Lago Vista with no place to hide 
and no incentive to flee, and common sense says she would almost 
certainly have buckled up,” Turek arrested her.212 Atwater’s friend 
found out what was happening and came to take charge of the 
children while Turek cuffed Atwater and hauled her to the police 
station.213 Her mug shot was taken and she was left alone in jail for 
about an hour.214 Ultimately Atwater paid $50 after pleading no 
contest to the misdemeanor seatbelt offenses.215 The other charges 
stemming from the fact her purse had been stolen, rendering her 
unable to produce her license, were dismissed.216 
After this humiliating experience, Atwater sued, arguing that Turek 
had acted unreasonably in arresting her for a minor traffic 
misdemeanor as her children cried.217 The Court — over a vigorous 
dissent by Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer — affirmed the dismissal of Atwater’s lawsuit, with obvious 
misgivings about letting Turek enjoy impunity. The majority termed 
Turek’s decision to arrest “merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by 
a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor 
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judgment.”218 Empathizing with Atwater, the Court noted that if it 
were to fashion a standard for the uncontested facts of the case, 
Atwater might well prevail.219 To accommodate the general need for 
officers to make judgment calls “on the spur (and in the heat) of the 
moment” and the preference for simple rules, however, the majority 
categorically ruled that officers may arrest for even minor 
misdemeanors committed in the officer’s presence.220 This bright-line 
power to arrest for even minor offenses eliminated case-by-case 
consideration of potential abuses of the power.221  
In dissent, Justice O’Connor underscored Atwater’s “potentially 
serious consequences for the everyday lives of Americans.”222 After 
Atwater, an officer can arrest for a minor violation and then search 
incident to arrest the driver and the entire vehicle passenger 
compartment, including any purse or other container within, Justice 
O’Connor warned.223 Justice O’Connor foresaw that police might stack 
together the power to make a warrantless arrest for a minor traffic 
offense and the power to search a car and containers, such as purses or 
backpacks, inside — and worried about such tactics within the power 
of someone like Officer Turek. The “unbounded discretion carries 
with it grave potential for abuse,” Justice O’Connor wrote.224 In a 
decision issued the same term as Atwater, affirming the power of 
officers to arrest a motorist for a minor offense and search incident to 
arrest, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Breyer, also expressed caution, writing “if experience demonstrates 
‘anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,’ I 
hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent.”225 
The looming concern is that police will leverage the ability to arrest 
for minor offenses into the power to conduct a roving or even 
harassing search. Gant’s modest anti-gaming device is the limitation of 
the ability to search the vehicle incident to arrest to cases where there 
is a reason to believe there is evidence of the crime of arrest in the 
vehicle. This protects against the stacking together of the Atwater 
power to make arrests for minor misdemeanors and the search 
incident to arrest power to go on a further roving search. Such 
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stacking is unfair gaming because it is not a logical progression of 
police power expanding concomitantly as the signs of potential 
criminality increase. Rather, a roving search predicated on an arrest 
for a minor misdemeanor is outside the purpose of either exception. 
As the Court explained in Gant, if a motorist is stopped for a minor 
traffic offense, such as speeding or failure to signal before a turn, the 
interest in gathering evidence related to the offense does not justify 
the further intrusion of an automobile search because there will be no 
reason to believe the vehicle has evidence of the traffic offense.226 In its 
explication, the Gant Court cited Atwater and Knowles — a subtle 
“tell” about the potentially problematic gaming that had troubled the 
Court and was now being blocked by the anti-gaming device in the 
second prong of the Gant rule. 
3. Playing Through Proxies or Jurisdictional Gradients 
A third example of problematic conduct rule gaming is the use of 
proxy actors or jurisdictional shifts to avoid conduct rules, thereby 
subverting the purpose and protection of the rules. This is a tactic that 
has surfaced at various junctures both in domestic and cross-border 
police investigations227 and is currently very salient because of the 
continuing controversy over extraordinary rendition.  
A prime historical example of gaming jurisdictional gradients in 
protections comes from the period when the exclusionary rule applied 
only to federal agents, not state agents.228 The exclusionary rule is the 
Fourth Amendment’s prime remedy to deter police misconduct by 
excluding wrongfully obtained evidence against the defendant. 
Without the central remedy that put force into the otherwise largely 
toothless Fourth Amendment, it was as if the state police were not 
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s conduct rules.229 State officers 
would blatantly disregard Fourth Amendment protections, illegally 
seizing evidence and then handing it over to federal authorities on a 
silver platter for prosecution.230 The Supreme Court at first tried 
 
 226 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 227 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (involving 
kidnapping by DEA-paid Mexican nationals of doctor suspected to be involved in the 
torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena).  
 228 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 32-33 (1949). 
 229 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (recounting “the obvious 
futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment” to toothless remedies in states before 
extension of exclusionary rule). 
 230 For articles regarding the rampant violations, see, for example James A.C. 
  
2011] The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma 1449 
incremental stopgap rulings, for example, ruling in a Prohibition-era 
case that the exclusionary sanction applied where state agents seized 
liquor though no federal agents were present and there was no 
evidence of state-federal cooperation because the state troopers were 
plainly conducting the search to enable federal prosecution since the 
state had no Prohibition law.231 The Court ultimately eliminated the 
jurisdictional gradient in protections by extending the exclusionary 
remedy to the states in Mapp v. Ohio to give force to the Fourth 
Amendment across the jurisdictions.232 
Extraordinary rendition is an example of both playing through 
proxies and gaming of jurisdictional gradients. Extraordinary 
rendition is the transportation of suspects in U.S. custody to third-
party nations where foreign agents, sometimes with U.S. agent 
involvement, and sometimes not, engage in interrogation techniques 
forbidden by the U.S. Constitution.233 Essentially U.S. agents enlist 
foreign agents to do what is forbidden by the Constitution’s conduct 
rules or engage in conduct abroad that is patently forbidden at home. 
The gamesmanship plays on the blurriness of constitutional 
protections abroad.234 When U.S. police play through proxies or 
jurisdictional gradients, the same concerns that animate the 
prohibition are implicated — and certainly concern has been greatly 
roused.235 As discussed below, however, such conduct rule gaming can 
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be combined with decision rule gaming to evade consequences — and 
even review — of alleged foul play.  
C. Decision Rule Gaming 
Decision rule gaming involves playing upon the doctrines addressed 
to courts about how to apply the law. As classically conceived by 
Bentham, a decision rule is an instruction about how to punish for a 
conduct rule violation.236 The Article expands on the idea of decision 
rules to include doctrines steering courts in deciding what review, 
rules and remedies — if any — to frame. Decision rule gaming thus 
involves two variants: remedial rule gaming and framing rule gaming. 
Examples of each variant are analyzed below. 
1. Remedial Rule Gaming 
Remedial rule gaming plays upon gaps and soft spots in remedial 
regimes for conduct rule violations. A particularly blatant historical 
example is the peculiar period from 1949 to 1961 when the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizures applied to the states via the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment — but the key remedy 
that gave the Amendment teeth, the exclusionary rule, did not apply 
to the states.237 As previously detailed, police infamously gamed the 
remedial gap.238 The preceding section explained how we can conceive 
of taking advantage of jurisdictional gradients in protections — in this 
period, the de facto suspension of the Fourth Amendment’s conduct 
rules for police for lack of a remedy in the states — as conduct rule 
gaming. What police were also doing was remedial rule gaming in the 
sense that they were taking advantage of a remedial gap, the lack of an 
effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in the states. By 
1961, the Court was sufficiently troubled by the blatant police gaming 
of the remedial gap to close it and halt the gaming.239  
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A second example of gaming of remedial rules is presented by 
United States v. Payner,240 involving a patently illegal search that played 
on the “standing” doctrine. The “standing” doctrine provides that a 
defendant is not entitled to exclusion of evidence from an illegal 
search unless the search violates his personal rights.241 Because Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted,242 
the violation must have invalidly transgressed the defendant’s 
legitimate expectation of privacy, not that of a third party.243 In 
Payner, the Internal Revenue Service was investigating the potentially 
illegal financial activities of Americans banking in the Bahamas.244 At 
the behest of federal investigators, private investigator and occasional 
informant Norman Casper cultivated a relationship with a bank 
president.245 Casper cooperated with federal agents in arranging for 
another person to take the banker to dinner while he entered the 
banker’s apartment and stole a briefcase, photographed the contents, 
then slipped it back into the apartment.246 Among the items thus 
illegally pilfered and photographed was a loan guarantee agreement 
establishing that defendant Jack Payner had a secret foreign bank 
account.247 The Supreme Court observed that while “[n]o court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of those 
who planned and executed this ‘briefcase caper,’ ” exclusion of 
evidence should be limited because of the costs it exacts on the truth-
finding process.248 The Court took a hands-off approach, noting that 
while “decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of 
willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name of law 
enforcement,” the exclusionary remedy would not be granted in every 
case of illegality.249 
In the Fifth Amendment context, however, the Court has been less 
hands-off and shy about intervening. The third example is the two-
step midstream Miranda interrogation strategy in Seibert. The 
preceding section analyzed the tactic as conduct rule gaming 
accomplished by going through the motions of the required rights 
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advisal while playing with timing to drain the advisal of substance and 
effect. In pursuing the two-step strategy, investigators were combining 
the conduct rule gaming with a form of remedial rule gaming that 
played upon the rule of Oregon v. Elstad, holding that fruits of 
confessions taken in violation of Miranda are admissible.250 
Indeed police training manuals played on the remedial gap posed by 
the Elstad fruits rule. For example, a publication of the Police Law 
Institute advised: “At any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, 
usually after arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the 
Miranda warnings and ask for a waiver. If the arrestees waive their 
Miranda rights, officers will be able to repeat any subsequent 
incriminating statements later in court.”251 In Seibert, counsel for 
Missouri similarly argued that the second confession was admissible 
because, under Elstad, the fruits of un-Mirandized confessions are 
admissible.252 
The Seibert plurality refused to allow the government to game the 
rule of Elstad, holding this would “disfigure[]” Elstad.253 The plurality 
distinguished Elstad as involving “innocent neglect” of Miranda and an 
“oversight.”254 Thus, at least for the midstream two-step Miranda 
strategy, the Court interposed an anti-gaming protection, albeit a 
limited rule patch when it comes to the two-step strategy. 
2. Framing Rule Gaming 
The third variant in the tripartite taxonomy, framing rule gaming, is 
the most subtle, mysterious, and potentially potent and intractable. 
Framing rule gaming involves playing upon the Court’s 
decisionmaking doctrines, particularly those that call for deference to 
considerations such as police experience and needs in the field,255 or 
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the Executive Branch,256 or noninquiry into matters such as a law 
enforcement officer’s subjective intent,257 the manner in which an 
accused comes before the Court,258 or state secrets.259 The strategy is 
potent and potentially intractable because noninquiry and deference 
mean potential conduct rule subversion or outright violations simply 
do not come to light, and the questions remains murky and 
unresolved. Moreover, deference to law enforcement experience and 
interests mean power may proliferate to new contexts without a 
requirement of proof of assumptions undergirding the shift. 
a. Gaming Rules of Noninquiry and Deference to the Executive 
The first of three examples in this subsection takes up where 
subsection III.B.3 left off — the combining of conduct rule gaming 
using foreign proxies or U.S. operatives abroad to do what U.S. agents 
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(dismissing suit because of successful assertion of state secrets privilege). 
  
1454 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:1407 
may not with framing rule gaming of doctrines of noninquiry and 
deference. The potency of this approach to deflect review is illustrated 
by the fact the federal courts have thus far declined to recognize a 
remedy for individuals subjected to harsh and degrading treatment 
under the Bush Administration’s extraordinary rendition program.260 
Cases have foundered on either the state secrets privilege261 or the 
judiciary declining to allow a cause of action for money damages to 
remedy constitutional violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents on the ground that the “special factors” of deference to the 
Executive and to Congress mean that the judiciary should bow out of 
policing constitutional protections.262  
A common law evidentiary privilege with potentially strong force 
and teeth in the War on Terror era, the state secrets privilege is 
founded on deference to the President’s authority over national 
security. The Supreme Court has indicated that the state secrets 
privilege has “constitutional overtones” stemming from the 
Executive’s Article II authority to conduct foreign affairs and provide 
for the national defense.263 The privilege permits the government to 
prevent disclosure of information in a judicial proceeding if “there is a 
reasonable danger” that such disclosure “will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”264 
Not only might the privilege deny plaintiffs key evidence to their suit 
and potentially result in dismissal on summary judgment, the privilege 
can be a basis for dismissal of a suit altogether where “the 
circumstances make clear that sensitive military secrets will be so 
central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to 
proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters.”265  
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Arar, 585 F.3d at 574-80; In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 103-07.  
 263 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953).  
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for compensation for death stemming from alleged contract for espionage). 
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The privilege was first recognized by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Reynolds,266 a 1953 case involving a damages suit by widows 
of civilians killed in the crash of a B-29 aircraft. The widows sought 
the U.S. Air Force’s official accident investigation reports and the three 
surviving crew members’ statements about the incident.267 The Air 
Force Judge Advocate General filed an affidavit invoking the state 
secrets privilege, asserting the plane was on “a highly secret” Air Force 
mission and materials could not be released “without seriously 
hampering national security, flying safety and the development of 
highly technical and secret military equipment.”268 The Court ruled 
that the Air Force need not disclose the documents — not even in 
camera and in chambers to the judge alone — due to the “privilege 
against revealing military secrets.”269 
In contemporary times, the state secrets privilege has played a role 
in averting review of the Bush Administration’s extraordinary 
rendition program. In a decision affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, the 
Eastern District of Virginia relied on the state secrets privilege to 
dismiss a suit by German citizen Khaled El-Masri, alleging 
extraordinary rendition for physically violent and degrading 
interrogation. El-Masri alleged that he was kidnapped in Macedonia, 
beaten, stripped of his clothing, and sodomized, then drugged, 
degraded, and transported to Kabul, Afghanistan where he was beaten 
and detained for four months with the participation of a CIA “black 
renditions” team and two other Americans as well as Afghani 
authorities.270 The Director of the CIA submitted an ex parte classified 
declaration for the judge and an unclassified declaration for the public 
record.271 The public-record declaration stated generally that damage 
to national security would result if the government were asked to 
admit or deny El-Masri’s declarations.272 The declaration to the judge 
argues that any admissions or denials of allegations concerning a 
clandestine intelligence program and the means and methods of 
implementing it would gravely endanger national security.273 
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Accepting the Government’s invocation of the privilege, District 
Judge T.S. Ellis dismissed El-Masri’s suit on the ground that resolution 
of the suit would risk disclosure of state secrets, and no amount of 
effort and care would safeguard the privileged material.274 Judge Ellis 
concluded that “while dismissal of the complaint deprives El-Masri of 
an American judicial forum for vindicating his claims . . . El-Masri’s 
private interests must give way to the national interest in preserving 
state secrets.”275 
Affirming the judgment, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the privilege 
was properly invoked even though some details of the government’s 
extraordinary rendition program were public.276 Litigating the case 
would expose sensitive details about “how the CIA organizes, staffs, 
and supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations” and require 
witnesses whose very identities are state secrets.277 Moreover, the 
government could not mount a defense without privileged evidence, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded. For example, disputing El-Masri’s 
claims about how he was interrogated would require disclosure of 
interrogation tactics, and disputing claims of CIA personnel 
involvement would reveal staffing information.278 The Fourth Circuit 
rejected El-Masri’s argument for protective procedures that would still 
enable him to pursue his case, reading Reynolds as foreclosing even 
review by the judge alone of such state secrets.279 
In short, the judiciary would close its eyes to El-Masri’s allegations 
because of the state secrets privilege, with no requirement that there 
be alternative avenues of review or remedy through the coordinate 
branches. The Fourth Circuit was cognizant of “the gravity of [its] 
conclusion that El-Masri must be denied a judicial forum for his 
Complaint.”280 Whether and if U.S. agents had transgressed 
constitutional conduct rules would remain shrouded in mystery.  
Two other cases seeking redress for extraordinary rendition have 
foundered on the “special factors” doctrine of deference to the 
coordinate branches.281 Most recently, on November 2, 2009, the 
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Second Circuit en banc in Arar v. Ashcroft affirmed dismissal of a 
Bivens action by a plaintiff seeking redress for alleged extraordinary 
rendition to Syria, where he was tortured.282 The plaintiff, Maher Arar, 
alleged that he was seized and detained while changing planes at John 
F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, based on a warning by 
Canadian authorities that he was an Al Qaeda member. Arar was 
rendered to Syria via Jordan, where he was subjected to physical 
violence for twelve days, including beatings on his palms, hips, and 
lower back with an electric cable.283  
The main issue that the Second Circuit sitting en banc considered 
was whether Arar could assert claims for detention and torture in Syria 
under the venerable vehicle for tort suits against federal officers for 
constitutional violations, Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.284 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an 
implied private right of action for damages against federal officers 
alleged to have violated a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights for the 
purpose of deterring officers from committing constitutional 
violations.285 While central to policing constitutional protections, 
Bivens is criticized as usurping the legislative role of creating rights of 
action.286 The Supreme Court has, therefore, been cautious in 
extending the judicially fashioned Bivens remedy to “new contexts”287 
outside of its Fourth Amendment-protecting origins, recognizing only 
two more nonstatutory damages remedies, for employment 
discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause288 and Eighth 
Amendment violations by prison officials.289 Since 1980, the Court has 
recognized no “new contexts” and has rejected a host of possible 
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 289 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-18 (1980).  
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extensions.290 The Court has explained that the decision whether to 
recognize a Bivens remedy requires two considerations: (1) whether 
any “alternative existing process for protecting the interest amounts to 
a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a 
new and freestanding remedy in damages,” and (2) “even in the 
absence of an alternative,” whether “any special factors counsel[] 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”291 
The Second Circuit has held that extraordinary rendition is a new 
context for a Bivens claim.292 The question then became whether to 
recognize a cause of action for the new context.293 The Second Circuit 
declined to consider whether any alternative remedial scheme was 
available because it found that “special factors” of impact on the 
Executive’s conduct of diplomacy, foreign policy, and national security 
in the extraordinary rendition context “sternly counsel hesitation.”294 
The Second Circuit underscored the Supreme Court’s counsel that 
“matters touching upon foreign policy and national security fall within 
an area of executive action ‘in which courts have long been hesitant to 
intrude’ absent congressional authorization.”295 Moreover, 
adjudicating Arar’s claim would call for considering the classified 
material of three nations, the Second Circuit reasoned, a task ill-suited 
for courts, which are typically open-access and might lead to a 
“graymail” problem where the government will pay up rather than 
give up sensitive information.296 
Thus, the decision-steering rules of the state secrets privilege and 
the “special factors” analysis about whether to extend Bivens actions 
effectively leave potential constitutional conduct rule violations 
shrouded in mystery and devoid of judicial deliberation. The potency 
of framing rule gaming is that police can transgress or push hard 
against constitutional norms with the security of knowing that the 
doctrines of nonadjudication will forestall consequences for the 
conduct. Even more problematically, courts eschewing scrutiny out of 
deference for the coordinate branches have also refrained from 
requiring data about whether the coordinate branches offer effective 
review or a remedy. 
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b. Gaming Deference to Law Enforcement 
The second example is not from the more exotic and mysterious 
cross-border context, but from the criminal procedure of the everyday. 
In framing rules of constitutional criminal procedure, the Supreme 
Court shows deference to the needs of law enforcement officers in the 
field.297 Some of the most important cases of criminal procedure shaping 
the everyday experiences and liberties of every person who drives or 
walks down the street are founded on these rules of deference.  
An example involves one of the most controversial everyday powers 
of police — the ability to initiate a Terry stop and frisk. The police 
power to stop and frisk was a flashpoint in communities of color in the 
1960s even before the Supreme Court blessed the tactic in Terry v. 
Ohio. Though it noted that stop and frisk tactics “are a major source of 
friction between police and minority groups,” Terry held that stops and 
frisks are permissible based on the lower standard of reasonable 
articulable suspicion.298 More than four decades later, the power to stop 
and frisk remains a flashpoint today, as the number of police stops soar 
even as crime rates decrease — and the brunt of the tactic is borne by 
Blacks and Latinos.299 The available data in New York, for example, 
collected under the terms of a settlement of a racial profiling suit,300 
indicates that eighty-three percent of people stopped by the New York 
Police Department in 2008 were African-American or Latino.301  
 
 297 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (automatic power to 
order passenger out of stopped car without requirement of reasonable suspicion 
passenger poses danger); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (automatic 
precautionary power to search closets and other spaces immediately adjoining place of 
arrest from which attack could be immediately launched, regardless of whether 
officers have probable cause or reasonable suspicion); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (automatic power to order driver out of car in routine traffic 
stop regardless of whether officers have reason to suspect foul play from motorist); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233-39 (1973) (automatic power to search 
person of suspect incident to arrest regardless of lack of reasonable basis to believe 
suspect poses risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence).  
 298 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11, 30, 35 (1968). 
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The difficulty in piercing the opacity surrounding the practice to 
stop and frisk stems from deference to the needs of law enforcement in 
the street. This is illustrated by the main case in which the Supreme 
Court addressed concerns about racial profiling, Whren v. United 
States.302 In Whren, D.C. police officers became suspicious upon seeing 
young black men in a truck with temporary license plates in what they 
termed a “high drug area.”303 What was so suspicious about being 
young, Black, in a disadvantaged community and driving a truck with 
lawful temporary license plates? According to the officer, his 
suspicions were roused when the driver looked into the passenger’s 
lap and paused at an intersection for more than twenty seconds.304 
These actions — that people lawfully in a truck frequently perform for 
myriad lawful reasons — led the officers to flip around in a U-turn to 
tail the truck.305 Followed by officers, the truck turned right without 
signaling and proceeded at what officers deemed an “unreasonable 
speed.”306 The officers thereupon stopped the car, walked up, and, 
according to their testimony, saw two large plastic bags of what looked 
like crack cocaine blatantly in plain view in defendant Whren’s 
hands.307  
Appealing their narcotics-related conviction, the defendants argued 
that because driving is extensively regulated by myriad spongy 
provisions, such as the requirement that driving must be at a speed 
“reasonable and prudent under the conditions” or that the driver must 
give “full time and attention” to vehicle operation, police have ample 
cover to pursue a pretextual stop.308 As students introduced to Whren 
learn, police can always follow a car on public streets until they catch 
some traffic violation, such as a failure to signal on a turn by 
individuals nervous about being tailed. Police, therefore, have nearly 
unconstrained power to target individuals for little more than being 
young, Black, and male.309  
The Supreme Court in Whren rejected the defendants’ request that 
the Court intervene to mitigate the risk of racial targeting. The Court 
first reiterated that constitutional criminal procedure — particularly 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence — generally eschews case-specific 
inquiry into the subjective motivations of officers.310 One of the main 
explanations for this stance is that the necessarily quick ad hoc 
judgment calls that officers make on the street are not susceptible to a 
step-by-step analysis.311 The second oft-invoked reason is that the 
administrative difficulties, such as lengthy hearings, involved in 
assessing police motives is a substantial cost not worth the marginal 
increase in protection.312 The overarching concern is that the fluid and 
flexible police judgment calls made on the street should not be 
burdened by the probability of post hoc scrutiny and extensive 
examination and questioning of motives. In other words — the 
perceived need to defer to police outweighed concern for potential 
incursions on constitutional commitments. 
In Whren, therefore, the defendants searched for a way around the 
general rule of noninquiry into subjective intent and tried to argue 
instead that the test should be whether a reasonable officer would 
have made the stop in light of customary police practices.313 Writing 
for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia dismissed the notion as even 
more unworkable than inquiry into officers’ subjective intent, calling 
the exercise of “speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a 
hypothetical constable” akin to “virtual subjectivity.”314 Moreover, 
what a reasonable officer would do varies from place to place and time 
to time, and the Fourth Amendment could not be so variable.315 Whren 
concluded that in “the run-of-the-mine case,” there was “no realistic 
alternative” to the customary rule of deeming a search justified 
without further inquiry if officers could point to probable cause.316 
Case closed. 
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 315 Id. at 815.  
 316 Id. at 819.  
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But the case is not closed, of course, for communities of color where 
racial profiling remains an open wound and where perceived 
incongruity can perpetuate continued segregation and other harms.317 
Many innocent people — often Black men across class lines — have 
been subjected to humiliating stops and seizures.318 Some argue that 
disproportionate targeting may reflect an uneven distribution of 
criminal activity across communities, with impoverished communities 
where people of color are often concentrated suffering from higher 
amounts of crime and higher racial group representation in crime 
statistics.319 A study based on Los Angeles data between July 2003 and 
June 2004 by Professor Ian Ayres found, however, that even 
controlling for a host of variables, including uneven distribution of 
crime statistics across communities, African Americans and Latinos 
are “over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched, and over-arrested.”320 
The report found that, per 10,000 residents: 
• The Black stop rate is 3,400 stops higher and the Latino 
stop rate is nearly 360 stops higher than the White stop 
rate.321 
• Stopped Blacks are 127% more likely to be frisked and 
stopped than Whites; Latinos are 43 percent more likely to 
be frisked.322 
 
 317 For compelling analyses, see, for example, DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE 
AND CLASS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-41, 48-52 (1999); I. Bennett Capers, 
Policing, Race and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 56-72 (2009).  
 318 See, e.g., Alison Bath, Day 1: Racial Profiling? Traffic Citations Database Shows 
Blacks Cited More Often for Traffic Offenses, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, 
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/NEWS01/801200
301 (analyzing data); Richard A. Fausset & P.J. Huffstutter, Black Males’ Fear of Racial 
Profiling Very Real, Regardless of Class, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2009, http://articles. 
latimes.com/2009/jul/25/nation/na-racial-profiling25 (detailing experiences); Transcript, 
Is Racial Profiling Real?, THINK TANK WITH BEN WATTENBERG (PBS broadcast July 19, 
2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_967.html (statements of Paul 
Butler) (discussing phenomenon). 
 319 E.g., Heather MacDonald, What Looks Like Profiling Might Just Be Good Policing, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_ 
latimes-what_looks_like.htm; see also Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and 
Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 277 (2007) (examining such 
stereotypes). 
 320 Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of the Racially Disparate Outcomes in 
the Los Angeles Police Department, ACLU at 3, 33 (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47. 
 321 Id. at 33. 
 322 Id. 
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In the decade since Whren, therefore, the problem of profiling has 
persisted while Whren stands as a controversial landmark of 
noninquiry and “a license to make racial distinctions.”323 Whren is a 
lightning rod for controversy because the Court took a don’t ask, don’t 
tell approach allowing police to do whatever it takes — without 
examining the accuracy of police beliefs about what it takes, basing 
deference on noninquiry rules rather than data. Only after extensive 
effort by impact litigation organizations like the ACLU and NAACP, 
and suits for structural reform brought by the United States under 42 
U.S.C. § 14141, which authorizes injunctive relief to address a pattern 
or practice of deprivation of constitutional rights, have profiling data 
begun to emerge several decades after Whren.324 Hard-fought suits that 
lead to successful settlements can spur information cascades by 
making a problem politically salient, spurring legislative action, or 
giving impetus to departments voluntarily to adopt measures rather 
than face suit.325 The extensive time and effort poured into such data-
forcing impact litigation illustrates, however, the high costs posed by 
opacity and judicial noninquiry. 
IV. ANTI-GAMING STANDARDS 
The dilemma of policing the police is that we yearn for aggressive 
tactics against the bad guys. Closing our eyes to police rule-pushing 
and ducking, however, means aggressive and transgressive tactics may 
be used against everyone. The challenge is to sort through the mixed 
messages sent to police and spell out minimum conceptions of what is 
fair versus foul play. The first step towards addressing problematic 
 
 323 Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran, The Story of Law and American Racial 
Consciousness: Building a Canon One Case at a Time, 76 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 851, 
873-74 (2008). 
 324 See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, Civil No. 00-
11769-GAF (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001) (example of consent decree); Memorandum of 
Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t. of Justice and the City of Cincinnati, Ohio and 
Cincinnati Police Dep’t, Case No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2002) (example of 
settlement); Daniels v. New York, 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS), Stipulation of Settlement 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000) (providing example of settlement). 
 325 Indeed, today, about half of the states have enacted some form of anti-racial 
profiling legislation. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE 
ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 40 (2009) (survey of state legislation 
summarizing state legislative developments). Police Departments have also voluntarily 
begun collecting data to self-monitor in the wake of successful suits in other 
jurisdictions. See Michael E. Buerger & Amy Farrell, The Evidence of Racial Profiling: 
Interpreting Documented and Unofficial Sources, 5 POLICE Q. 272, 273-74 (2002) 
(summarizing reforms).  
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police gaming is this fundamental task of defining and understanding 
the problem. The preceding two parts of this Article were, therefore, 
focused on this foundational task. With the foundational 
understanding in place, we also have a basis to consider further 
approaches to shore up the zones most subject to problematic police 
gaming and remedying the problem. Anti-gaming approaches can 
operate at different junctures of the criminal justice process. Ideally, 
we need better steering in advance of action as well as an approach 
that enables more efficient self-monitoring by the police to ensure 
compliance and remedies during and after decisionmaking.  
This section proposes deploying anti-gaming standards in 
particularly risk-prone zones for police to help better steer decisions in 
advance. The next section explores the possibility of incorporating 
data-development remedial rules to enable more efficient and effective 
self-policing by the police and remedies in the event of error during 
and after decisionmaking. Other creative strategies are certainly 
possible. This Article is, therefore, an invitation to a discussion, as 
well as a vehicle for forwarding remedial proposals. The proposals for 
redress offered below are among the ways we can think outside the 
current box of constitutional criminal procedure, with vantage 
enhanced by peering into and beginning to understand the opaque 
domain of police gaming. Moving beyond bright-line fetishism is a 
starting point. 
A. Beyond Bright-Line Fetishism 
Gaming of the rules in constitutional criminal procedure is 
facilitated by what Professor Albert Alschuler has memorably dubbed 
the Supreme Court’s “bright-line fever”326 in choosing rules rather 
than standards to regulate the police. One of the framing approaches 
prevalent in constitutional criminal procedure is a preference for 
bright-line categorical rules that apply across cases rather than 
standards requiring police to consider whether the reasons justifying 
an incursion on liberty, privacy, and security are present.327 Rules 
generally have a simpler operation: if condition A exists, you may do 
B.328 For example, Belton’s bright-line rule, as construed by the police 
 
 326 See Alschuler, supra note 28, at 229 (analyzing how Supreme Court opted for 
bright-line rules in formulating guidelines for police).  
 327 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (explaining preference). 
 328 Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 
‘Bright Lines’ and ‘Good Faith,’ 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 326-27 (1982).  
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and the majority of lower courts until Gant, was that if officers 
arrested someone in or near a car they could search it automatically.329  
The assumption underlying the preference for bright-line rules is 
that they are more easily administrable by officers who have to make 
on-the-fly judgment calls. Experience has shown better, however. 
Police gaming, particularly in “high-risk” zones where the potential 
evidentiary gain is high, has been among the pressures behind the 
proliferation of rules making criminal procedure akin to the 
notoriously complex tax code.330 Just as tax law has become riddled 
with elaborations and exceptions in a struggle to differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate tax avoidance, so too has constitutional 
criminal procedure had to deal with gaming of the rules by highly 
sophisticated actors.  
In the abstract, categorical rules have the seeming advantage of 
simplified administration, predictability, and the diminution of the 
need for on-the-spot judgment calls that may be colored by subjective 
differences between officers.331 In reality, of course, as the trajectory of 
criminal procedure doctrine has amply demonstrated, rules can be 
complex, unpredictable, and difficult to administer when they become 
a tangle of cross-cutting exceptions that try at once to accommodate 
law enforcement rule-pushing and shut down the most egregious 
forms of gaming.332 Even a seemingly bright-line rule in practice 
requires contextual judgment calls and refinements that muddy the 
imagined clarity of a rule. For example, as Justice Stevens writing for 
the Court in Gant observed, a host of questions have arisen despite the 
seeming bright-line Belton rule that a car can be searched incident to 
arrest such as how close in time the search must be to the arrest and 
how proximate the first contact with the arrestee must be to the 
vehicle.333  
We can no longer claim the advantage of clarity or simplicity in the 
preference for categorical rules. Yet the preference for categorical rules 
persists as does the notion that they are better suited for steering law 
 
 329 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“[W]hen a policeman has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.”). 
 330 See Steven A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of 
Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 957 (2006).  
 331 Id. at 227-28.  
 332 Cf. White, supra note 78, at 1670 (explaining how lack of clarity and 
complexity of rules in constitutional criminal procedure stems in part from police 
rule-pushing). 
 333 See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct 1710, 1720 (2009).  
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enforcement officers. Part of the lingering preference is founded on 
the caricaturized conception of the officer in the field. As Alschuler 
observed wryly, “[i]f the Supreme Court’s assertion of the need for 
bright line rules is taken at face value,” the officer is conceived of as a 
dimwitted, hulking Officer Gazenga: 
Gazenga is a good officer. He has memorized all 437 Supreme 
Court bright line rules for search and seizure. For example, 
Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in a car. Gazenga rip that car 
apart! But Gazenga never touch trunk of car unless there is 
probable cause, for Gazenga has read footnote 4 of Belton 
opinion. 
Now Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in a house. Different 
bright line rule apply to a house. Gazenga may search glove 
compartment of car when suspect far away, but may not 
search desk drawer in living room unless suspect right there. 
Why? Supreme Court say so. Gazenga just a cop.334 
Of course officers are much smarter and more should be expected. 
The challenge is how we can reorient criminal procedure in 
practicable ways to communicate such expectations and better elicit 
such behavior. 
B. Anti-Gaming Standards 
As the primary code regulating police, constitutional criminal 
procedure needs to be attuned to approaches that foster the 
development and internalization of constitutional values and empower 
adjudicators to check police power without further complicating the 
maze of criminal procedure. Law enforcement cannot be entirely 
encased in rules because the nature of the work entails strategic 
planning and subjective judgment that cannot be monitored at every 
moment. Rather than spew a tangle of rules, constitutional criminal 
procedure must also deploy anti-gaming standards that better inform 
officer judgment based on the principles and purposes behind legal 
mandates and empower adjudicators to check officers without further 
complicating the labyrinthine maze of rules that comprise criminal 
procedure.  
The argument is not about which legal form is superior — both 
rules and standards have their merits. The argument is that we have 
neglected the merits of standards in informing police judgment and 
 
 334 Alschuler, supra note 28, at 285-86. 
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empowering adjudicators to check transgressions. Better balancing of 
bright-line fetishism with anti-gaming standards can help cultivate 
principle-guided organizational culture and cut down on the need for 
a thicket of rules and exceptions and the resulting proliferation of 
complexity that defeats the goal of effective and efficient guidance. 
The approach also would help plug gaps and ambiguities in the law, 
and allow for more responsive and efficient guidance in high-risk 
zones where the incentive to game is greatest. 
1. Cultivating a Principle-Guided Police Organizational Culture 
Constitutional criminal procedure’s framing approach can draw a 
lesson from the insights of scholars of organizational management. 
Police practices stem from organizational culture because police are 
shaped, socialized, trained, monitored, and evaluated by departments 
and vocational collectivities.335 Professional organizations cultivate 
what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would term the habitus of police 
officers, that is, the ingrained habitual ways of thinking, perceiving, 
judging, and acting that are conditioned through the everyday 
experience of customs, norms, and education within the group.336  
Many organizations have the goal of fostering ethical behavior in the 
sense of adherence to the spirit or purpose of the rules.337 Managers 
realize that rules can only do so much in constraining and steering 
behavior because the point of having people perform tasks is to have 
human judgment in the myriad situations that arise in the course of 
work. The goal is not to have rules disappear, but to ensure that 
principles guide police behavior to the point where the rules are 
automatically adhered to and variation in conduct around the target 
value is reduced.338 Defining the target principle and communicating 
the principle to police departments is a critical aspect of achieving the 
aim of conditioned adherence as a matter of orientation.339  
 
 335 For an examination of police regulation from the organizational management 
perspective, see, for example, R.R. ROBERG & J. KUYKENDALL, POLICE ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT: BEHAVIOR, THEORY AND PROCESSES (1990). 
 336 The notion of habitus in Pierre Bourdieu’s work takes different shapes. For 
articulations, see, for example, PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 17, 
78-86 (Richard Nice trans., 2002) (1977); PIERRE BOURDIEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON 
THE THEORY OF ACTION 8-9 (1998); Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction, to 
Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Legal Field, 38 HASTINGS 
L.J. 805, 807, 811 (1987). 
 337 Val D. Hawks et al., Establishing Ethics in an Organization by Using Principles, 10 
SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 259, 262 (2004). 
 338 Id. at 264. 
 339 Id. at 262-65. 
  
1468 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:1407 
Standards serve the important role of communicating and educating 
regarding the underlying principles. A standard in lieu of a rule can 
educate in a more robust manner and change perception regarding 
entitlement to the exercise of power. For example, a standard that 
vehicle may be searched incident to arrest only if there is a reasonable 
basis to believe there is a need to avert destruction of evidence or 
danger to officers encapsulates the balance struck in the limited grant 
of power and the reasons for it. The standard also communicates that 
searches incident to arrest are not a prerogative if an officer finds a 
basis for an arrest. Rather, the standard communicates the underlying 
logic that the power is an exception to the default rule of protection 
against intrusive practices. In contrast, a bright-line rule that if you 
arrest near a car you can search it, sends a much different message of 
prerogative that the Court in Gant deplored.  
Standards also reflect that we expect more out of officers than 
operating at an Incredible Hulk level of moral development. We 
expect actions to be guided by larger principles. Inducing functioning 
at a more advanced level of moral reasoning may also offer the 
collateral benefit of bias suppression by eliciting greater deliberation 
rather than rote application of a rule. Studies suggest that those 
operating at a higher stage of moral development suppress biases such 
as self-interest and pre-conceived notions, in making judgments.340 
The potential of bias suppression is tantalizing in the domain of 
criminal law and procedure where too often, we see disparities that 
may result from unconsciously harbored implicit bias based on 
negative perceptions of people of color.341 
 
 340 Liisa Myyry & Klaus Helkama, Moral Reasoning and the Use of Procedural Justice 
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The Supreme Court has recently pointed to the “increasing 
professionalism of police forces” as a basis for shifting constitutional 
criminal procedure’s remedial stance.342 It is time to expect more in 
terms of behavior as well and to break from the doctrinal tendency to 
treat police as jocks who should not be asked to think too much on 
the fly and in the field.343  
2. Reducing Rule Proliferation and Complexity and Plugging Gaps 
Standards also diminish the need for a complicated host of rules. 
Albert Alschuler has influentially argued that Fourth Amendment law, 
the main code regulating police, is incomprehensible not because of 
the lack of categorical rules, but because there are too many.344 As 
organizational management scholars have noted, skewing too far 
toward preferring rules risks “fall[ing] victim to volumes of specific 
laws and rules that must undergo constant modification and addition” 
— even as “behavior worsens and many spend their time trying to find 
ways around the specifications at best, or even worse, gradually loosen 
specifications in an attempt to reduce violations.”345 Standards, in 
contrast, are elastic enough to capture an array of situations that may 
arise and steer judgment in advance by embodying the principles that 
we want to guide officers.  
Elevating standards above rule-think can also help guide judgment 
in areas of legal ambiguity and plug “holes” in protections created by 
jurisdictional gradients or playing through proxies. A prime 
contemporary example is the ambiguity surrounding physically 
coercive interrogations abroad. As the Supreme Court began realizing 
the human costs of a hands-off approach to police regulation through 
early graphic and shocking cases such as Brown v. Mississippi 
involving interrogation by whipping and simulated hanging, the Court 
ruled that the use of confessions obtained through methods “revolting 
to the sense of justice” violated constitutional due process.346 The due 
process standard evolved over time to a less visceral gut-reaction 
formulation to the more familiar and law-like voluntariness standard 
based on whether the defendant’s “will was overborne.”347 This 
 
 342 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006). 
 343 See supra Part I. 
 344 Alschuler, supra note 28, at 287. 
 345 Hawks et al., supra note 337, at 266. 
 346 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).  
 347 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1964) (cataloguing cases 
moving to voluntariness standard and inquiry as to whether defendant’s will was 
overborne). 
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standard has a historical antecedent in the Court’s early decision in 
Bram v. United States, excluding involuntary statements made to 
Canadian officials by a ship officer suspected of murder under the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.348 Voluntariness 
and protection against methods such as violent interrogation or sleep 
deprivation to overbear a suspect’s will is a minimum constitutionally 
compelled baseline distinct from the infamously controversial 
“prophylactic” Miranda advisal requirement.349 The extent of 
constitutional regulation of incriminating statements extracted abroad 
through violence or other coercive methods calculated to overbear a 
suspect’s will is unclear, however, particularly if the interrogators are 
foreign actors rather than U.S. law enforcement.350 The unstable and 
seesawing constitutional status of Miranda and potential distinctions 
in the level of protection for Miranda’s prophylactic protections 
compared to the clearly constitutionally compelled requirement of 
voluntariness further deepen the murk.  
An overly rule-bound way of examining the issue leads to a 
proliferation of complexity and potential gaps for gaming. Does our 
tolerance for admitting statements obtained in ways that would violate 
the Constitution change if the statements are taken abroad?351 If the 
 
 348 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1897) (excluding statements 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).  
 349 The Supreme Court has seesawed over whether Miranda is constitutionally 
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statements are taken by foreign actors and while abroad?352 If the 
statements are taken by foreign actors abroad but with some 
involvement by U.S. agents?353 If the statements are taken abroad by 
foreign actors with “substantial” involvement by U.S. agents making 
the interrogation a “joint venture” that would trigger even the 
controversial Miranda protections?354 What constitutes “substantial” 
involvement, and is shipping a suspect overseas for interrogation 
abroad by foreign agents substantial enough?355 And does protection 
differ depending on whether the person being interrogated is a U.S. 
national, a resident alien, or an alien who lacks “substantial 
connections” to the United States?356 Moreover, does that question in 
 
 352 Compare, e.g., United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(holding that involuntary statements extracted by foreign officials abroad must be 
excluded under Due Process Clause), with Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-
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(noting that Connelly has cast “serious doubt” on continuing vitality of prior holding 
that due process requires exclusion of involuntary statements extracted by foreign 
agents), and Condon, supra note 350, at 672-73 (noting that Connelly has cast doubt 
on whether Due Process Clause applies to involuntary statements extracted by foreign 
actors); Darmer, Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 232, at 364-65 
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implicate constitutional protections concerning involuntary statements).  
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Reclaiming the Lessons of Brown v. Mississippi in the Terrorism Cases, 66 GUILD PRAC. 
18, 29-30 (2009) [hereinafter Waterboarded Confessions] (arguing that involvement of 
U.S. officials in extraordinary rendition constitutes deterrable U.S. government actor 
behavior that should trigger constitutional regulation). 
 354 Cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
statements taken by foreign agents abroad are admissible if voluntary regardless of 
whether Miranda warnings were administered unless “joint venture” exception applies 
based on “substantial” involvement by U.S. agents). 
 355 See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 229 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
only few cases illuminate what might constitute “substantial” participation and “mere 
presence” at interrogation is insufficient). 
 356 Compare, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998) (“Resident 
aliens . . . are considered ‘persons’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and are 
entitled to the same protections under the [Self-Incrimination] Clause as citizens.”), 
and Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“The Fifth Amendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons [ i.e., non-citizens] from 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that 
constitutional protection.”), with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 
268-69, 271-72 (1990) (noting “we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to 
Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States” and 
holding that Fourth Amendment does not protect against search abroad of home of 
foreign national lacking “substantial connections” to United States). But see, e.g., In re 
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turn depend on whether one is talking about “fundamental” Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment due process protections rather than the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?357 And does the 
applicability of protections abroad also vary depending on whether at 
issue is the Miranda prophylactic protections for the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination rather than the Bram exclusion of 
statements involuntarily extracted in a particular case under the Fifth 
Amendment privilege?358  
While courts have indicated that statements that do not satisfy the 
minimum baseline standard of voluntariness are inadmissible, even if 
extracted by foreign agents,359 the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Colorado v. Connelly has been construed to cast some doubt on this.360 
Connelly had nothing to do with brutal or coercive methods by a 
foreign agent abroad at all, however. In Connelly, a mentally ill 
individual argued that his confession was involuntary because he was 
compelled by the voices in his head to speak.361 The Court held there 
must be action by a state actor and police overreaching for admission 
of assertedly involuntary statements to implicate the Due Process 
Clause, and asserted voices in one’s head do not count.362 The creative 
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11 (2002) (discussing implications of revival); Mary De Ming Fan, Citizenship 
Perception Strain in Cases of Crime and War: On Law and Intuition, 2010 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 16-33 (2010) (analyzing slippery significance of citizenship for protections in 
crime and war). 
 357 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69 (noting applicability of constitutional 
protections in territories depending on whether right is “fundamental” or not). See 
also source cited supra note 356 (contrasting Court’s different pronouncements).  
 358 Cf. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 145 (noting settled law that statements taken by foreign 
police without Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary). 
 359 E.g., Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348-49 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1967) 
(applying Bram Fifth Amendment protection against admission of involuntary 
statements to statements extracted by foreign agents). 
 360 See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 973 n.3 (1967) (noting that 
Connelly has cast doubt on continuing vitality of Brulay’s exclusion of statements 
extracted by foreign agents on voluntariness grounds); Condon, supra note 350, at 
672-73 (noting uncertainty after Connelly); Darmer, Waterboarded Confessions, supra 
note 351, at 364-65 (noting that after Connelly, due process voluntariness review may 
not apply to statements extracted by foreign agents).  
 361 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161, 163-64 (1986). 
 362 Id. at 164. 
  
2011] The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma 1473 
stretch of a defense argument in Connelly is a far cry from the 
government attempting to build a case based on involuntary 
statements extracted by foreign actors through violence, threat of 
violence, or other infirm tactics. For Connelly’s inapposite situation to 
trump the general principle would be to allow hyperliteral and slavish 
rule-think to lead us to lose sight of the larger and longstanding 
principle.  
A lot of the confusion, profusion of potential rules, and ambiguity 
stems from losing sight of the overarching baseline principle in 
focusing on how far the many offshoots and possible permutations of 
rules may extend. A simpler approach steered by overarching principle 
is to reaffirm that the government may not make its case based on 
involuntary statements extracted through methods that affront 
constitutional due process such as torture, violence, or the threat of 
violence. The idea was elegantly stated by the Court in an earlier 
epoch before the advent of rule fetishism: “A coerced confession is 
offensive to basic standards of justice, not because the victim has a 
legal grievance against the police, but because declarations procured 
by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum will infer 
guilt.”363 This standard could guide and govern in a range of 
situations, obviating the need for a complex profusion of rules. In 
contrast, an approach that tries to regulate through a welter of rules — 
for example, if abroad + foreign agent + foreign national suspect + no 
U.S. agent involvement in interrogation, albeit involvement in 
deportation, then permissible; if abroad + foreign agent + U.S. national 
+ no implicit or explicit U.S. agent involvement then permissible, and 
so on — adjusts distinctions with much less difference and import 
than the overarching principle that gets lost in the details. 
3. The Virtues of Supple Standards in High-Risk Zones 
One can see the benefits of bright-line rules in some instances while 
also appreciating the need for anti-gaming standards. The point is that 
we need a more nuanced approach as to when we prefer categorical 
rules and when we might prefer standards. We particularly are 
plagued with the proliferation of rule complexity and rule-pushing 
when the stakes, in terms of direct evidentiary pay-off, are high. In 
contrast, bright-line rules offer the anticipated benefits of clarity, 
simplicity, and predictability in domains where there is not as much at 
stake in circumvention of the rules. Thus, for example, bright-line 
rules regarding the ability to order suspects out during a stop are less 
 
 363 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944). 
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prone to abuse because the anticipated evidentiary gain is slight and 
indirect. The pay-off of having bright-line rules in terms of clarity and 
administrative ease is thus realized in these situations. Indeed, we 
have not seen as pronounced a proliferation of complexity in the wake 
of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, giving police the automatic power to order 
motorists out of a car,364 or Maryland v. Wilson, giving police the 
automatic power to order passengers out of a car.365  
In dealing with issues where the temptation to transgress is greatest, 
we should deploy anti-gaming standards to supplement bright-line 
rules. For example, the rule that police generally may not search 
someone’s car or personal possessions without a warrant and probable 
cause would still apply. To constrain gaming around the rule, 
standards would supplement the rule. Examples of standards 
supplementing rules include the Chimel requisite that searches 
incident to arrest are justified if there is a threat to officer safety or risk 
of destruction of evidence. In contrast, where there is not much at 
stake in terms of evidentiary “gains” if rules are pushed, such as the 
ability to order passengers out of a car for officer safety, the benefits of 
bright-line rules without the cross-hatch of standards can be enjoyed.  
Anti-gaming standards, therefore, call for judicial consideration of 
the prospect of police gaming. Where the risk is high, because at issue 
is the power to obtain evidence otherwise out of reach, we should 
supplement rules with anti-gaming standards. The elasticity of 
standards means that potential abuses of constitutional values can be 
shut down without necessitating a rule change or new rules. Anti-
gaming standards, therefore, serve the interests of legal economy as 
well as officer education. 
The two highest-risk zones occur at the threshold of the ability to 
search and thus gain evidence, or the ability to interrogate and thus 
secure the “queen of proofs”366 — the confession that is often critical 
to closing a case and getting a guilty plea in a reality where more than 
ninety percent of cases conclude by plea bargain.367 The very thicket of 
 
 364 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977). 
 365 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997). 
 366 In Anglo-American law, the confession has long been regarded as “the queen of 
proofs.” EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 41 (1985). 
 367 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002) 
(noting more than ninety percent of cases end in plea bargain); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., 
Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 340 (2010) (noting more than ninety percent of cases 
end in plea bargain). For influential analyses of the heavy systemic reliance on plea 
bargains, see, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
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rules surrounding these powers reflects the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that these are particular investigative junctures prone to 
abuse of power. The proliferation of rule complexity in these domains 
particularly demonstrates how bright-line rules do not give the 
promised benefit of simplicity and relative administrative ease and 
comes at the substantial cost of sacrificing the elasticity and educative 
value of standards. 
To move from the abstract to the concrete: what would a choice of an 
anti-gaming standard to supplement a bright-line rule look like? An 
example arises from Missouri v. Seibert, involving the interrogate-first, 
Miranda-advisal-later procedure. The baseline bright-line rule is that 
police must administer a Miranda warning to suspects undergoing 
custodial interrogation. In Seibert, the problem was how to deal with 
gaming around this baseline rule. The Court turned to an anti-gaming 
standard as a limited patch. To circumvent the two-step tactic to disable 
the efficacy of Miranda advisals, the plurality of Justices Souter, Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer required that a subsequent advisal must function 
as effectively as Miranda requires in putting the suspect in an informed 
position, offering a real choice regarding whether to give a statement, 
and communicating that the suspect may stop speaking despite a prior 
statement.368 This is a good step forward in the particularly sensitive 
domain of extracting confessions, where stakes are high.  
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Seibert offers an example of a more 
efficient and effective anti-gaming standard because it applies more 
widely, to forestall and simplify the law across a span of contexts rather 
than operating as a post hoc patch. Justice Breyer called for a good-faith 
standard in evaluating failures to offer Miranda warnings coupled with 
the requirement of an effective advisal once the mistake is realized.369 
His rule was simple and administrable: exclude “the ‘fruits’ of initial 
unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”370 
 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2471-72 (2004) (analyzing systemic use of plea 
bargains); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 622-24 (2005) 
(analyzing heavy reliance on plea bargains); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30-40 (2002) (noting heavy 
reliance and debunking false dichotomy of plea bargains versus trials). 
 368 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2004). 
 369 Justice Breyer began by stating the “simple rule should apply to the two-stage 
interrogation technique.” Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring). As advocated above, 
however, the approach would be more efficient and less complicated as a general 
guide in the context of police questioning rather than limited to just one problematic 
tactic.  
 370 Id.  
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This approach underscores what we really want officers to be doing in 
the difficult task of policing — acting in good faith.  
The guidance given to police through such a standard would be 
more than just how to proceed following an initial failure to 
administer Miranda warnings. The message sent is that it is illegitimate 
to try to sidestep Miranda’s requirements — police are answerable for 
a failure to advise and must articulate why a failure was a good-faith 
mistake and how they tried to cure it to realize Miranda’s purpose and 
protections. The good-faith standard is familiar in criminal law and 
procedure, though it is becoming increasingly more forgiving of 
police. In its most recent pronouncement on the scope of the good-
faith exception to exclusion of evidence, the Supreme Court held that 
negligent mistakes by police still qualify for the good-faith exception 
to exclusion because conduct must be “sufficiently deliberate” to be 
deterrable and “sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the 
price paid by the justice system.”371  
It may seem counterintuitive to deploy standards in high-risk zones 
where the temptation towards transgression is greatest. After all, are 
not rules understood to be discretion-constraining and standards 
prone to abuse of discretion?372 The argument is not about sacrificing 
the constraining cross-hatch of rules or the power of rules in holding 
recalcitrant or conflicted actors to normative commitments. Rather, 
anti-gaming standards are supplements to trigger police internalization 
of the reasons behind the rules and empower adjudicators to call a 
foul through interpretation of an open-textured standard without the 
need to announce a new rule. 
We live in reality and are trying to improve a system run by fallible 
hardened humans dealing with some of the unhappiest aspects of 
reality. Problematic police gaming will occur. Anti-gaming standards 
will make it harder, however, to game. Most importantly, the aim of 
anti-gaming standards is to cultivate an understanding and 
internalization of constitutional values as something more than an 
obstacle course of bright-line rules. Moreover, when police play overly 
aggressively, standards need not grow new limbs of exceptions in 
order to call a foul. Unlike categorical rules, which tend to require 
new offshoots to address alternate plays, rendering the hoped-for 
bright line more akin to a Ganesh in form, standards are elastic 
enough to foreclose conduct as an aspect of elaboration and education 
 
 371 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698, 704 (2009). 
 372 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 33, at 1244-45 (suggesting that rules may be wise where 
standards may be subject to abuse, for example, by prosecutors, or “where the law 
plays a leadership role in establishing new standards and moral progress”). 
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about the meaning of a principle. In short, anti-gaming standards 
make it harder to game the rules of criminal procedure and easier and 
less costly to block problematic practices. 
V. DATA-DEVELOPMENT REMEDIAL RULES 
A second strategy to redress problematic police gaming operates at 
the level of remedies. In an era where the exclusionary rule’s cutback 
has proceeded apace373 and its possible demise is debated,374 now is a 
particularly opportune time to consider how adjustments to the 
predominant remedial approach may address the police 
gamesmanship dilemma. This Article proposes the incorporation of 
what it terms “data-development remedial rules” to supplement the 
ever-receding and narrowing exclusionary rule, either operating in 
tandem, or alone when exclusion is not offered as a remedy. 
A. Supplementing the Embattled and Eroded Exclusionary Rule 
The oft-repeated criticism of the exclusionary rule is that society 
suffers when the constable blunders because the remedy is deprivation 
of information, distorting the truth-finding process.375 Because of the 
“substantial social costs exacted” by exclusion, the contemporary 
Supreme Court has held that exclusion — though often the only 
realistically available remedy376 — should be the “last resort.”377 
 
 373 See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698, 704 (holding that costs of exclusion are too 
high to offer remedy for negligent police error leading to wrongful arrest and search); 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-94 (2006) (refusing to apply exclusionary 
remedy for knock-and-announce violation prior to entry into home). For recent 
commentary on the cutback, see, for example, David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth 
Amendment Remedial Equilibrium: A Commentary on Herring v. United States and 
Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 565-70 (2010). 
 374 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the 
Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191 (2010) (predicting demise of, or at least 
substantial limits on, exclusionary rule); Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the 
Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the 
Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209 (2010) (predicting retention of 
exclusionary rule or revival if discarded). 
 375 Justice Cardozo framed the iconic refrain in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 
(N.Y. 1926). The concern has steered recent cases portending the cutback of the 
exclusionary remedy based on severe criticism of its costs. See also David A. Harris, 
How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce — or Replace — the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 190 (2009). 
 376 See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 n.4, 707 (emphasizing that even today, 
exclusionary rule “is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment 
violation” because civil remedies are often precluded and criminal or administrative 
sanctions rarely pursued). 
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Indeed, distaste and reluctance concerning the remedy of exclusion 
have led increasingly to decisions to offer no remedy at all.378 For 
example, recently in Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the costs of exclusion were too high to offer the 
remedy for negligent police error that lead to an unlawful arrest and 
search incident to the arrest.379  
There is also an open empirical debate as to whether the 
exclusionary rule adequately deters violations. Study findings are 
mixed.380 What is clear is that police have plenty of incentive to 
transgress rules, even if they face exclusion. The fruits of unlawful 
searches and seizures can be used to impeach if a suspect goes to 
trial,381 deterring defendants from taking the stand, or forcing 
defendants to limit their stories if they do testify. Fruits of unlawful 
searches and seizures are also admissible in grand jury proceedings,382 
parole revocation hearings,383 deportation hearings,384 and civil 
investigations by agencies like the Internal Revenue Service.385  
Criminal procedure has been in search of an alternate remedial 
approach to replace the embattled exclusionary rule. One of the main 
contenders in the literature is damages of varying degrees of 
refinement.386 The Supreme Court has generally shown great concern, 
however, that damages will overdeter and chill vigorous policing 
because officers will ease up on the job rather than face individual 
 
 377 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. 
 378 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698, 704 (no remedy for wrongful arrest and search 
incident to arrest); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (no remedy for knock-and-announce 
violation prior to entry into home).  
 379 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698, 704.  
 380 Surveys of police suggest that they do care about exclusion of evidence — 
particularly in bigger profile cases where embarrassment is greater — and pursue 
insulating behavior, such as trying to obtain warrants if possible, to avoid exclusion. 
E.g., L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 
83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 709-11 (1998); Myron W. Orfield, Comment, The Exclusionary 
Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1016, 1017-1018, 1039 (1987). Yet studies also suggest the exclusionary rule is not a 
significant influence on most officers in deciding whether to search or seize. 
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 363, 369 & nn.6, 8 (summarizing studies).  
 381 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980).  
 382 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).  
 383 Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
 384 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042-44 (1984). 
 385 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1976).  
 386 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 380, at 364 (proposing monetary penalties 
approach as primary regulator). 
  
2011] The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma 1479 
liability. The recent decision in Pearson v. Callahan387 holding that 
litigants alleging violations of constitutional rights can have their suits 
dismissed without even a pronouncement as to whether the conduct 
alleged violates the Constitution so long as the violation is not “clearly 
established” does not portend a liberalization of the damages avenue 
any time soon. In practice, therefore, damages will probably remain a 
rarely viable remedy for defendants and thus insufficient as a 
supplement to the eroded exclusionary rule. 
Data-development remedial rules can help tackle the problem of the 
opacity of problematic police gaming practices. The idea behind data-
development remedial rules is to generate socially valuable 
information rather than controversially depriving the polity of 
information when the constable blunders. Data-development remedial 
rules can ameliorate the opacity that facilitates problematic police 
gamesmanship. The data-development approach draws insights from 
the notion of information-forcing rules more familiar in the realm of 
contracts. Information-forcing rules are a way to induce better 
informed and more sophisticated parties to reveal information that 
may otherwise be strategically withheld. One strategy of the 
information-inducing approach is to set default terms in a manner to 
incentivize the sophisticated actor to aim to modify the default terms 
and reveal information in the process.388  
In the criminal procedure context law enforcement officers and 
agencies are sophisticated repeat players in the best position to collect, 
aggregate and report data and rationales. Though best situated to 
produce and share information, law enforcement officials have 
strategic incentives to withhold information that would better inform 
doctrine and judicial and public deliberation. The perverse incentive 
arises because the law enforcement “share of the pie” — power — 
increases with information withholding though the “size of the pie” — 
total collective benefit and enriched deliberation over the propriety of 
police practices — increases with more information revelation.389  
One way to give police incentive to produce more information is to 
set a remedial penalty default that gives police departments incentive 
to engage in voluntary information production about the frequency of 
the violation identified and steps taken to avoid it in the future. An 
information-generating approach has potentially greater deterrent 
 
 387 129 S. Ct. 808, 816-17 (2009).  
 388 See Ayres, supra note 34, at 597; Ayers & Gertner, supra note 34, at 90, 97-101. 
 389 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 34, at 97-101 (arguing that penalty defaults 
should be set against parties who strategically withhold information that, if shared, 
would increase the size of pie because they want bigger slice of pie). 
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value than the eroded exclusionary rule. Even when it applies, the 
exclusionary rule does not as directly impact police interests because 
the investigation is still closed and off the books even if the job of the 
prosecutor in attaining conviction is harder. In contrast, an 
information-generating approach operates directly on departmental 
self-interest, which internalizes the full cost and deterrent force of the 
remedy because whether information-generation is court-ordered or 
voluntary, the department has to bear the full burden of the remedy.  
While we can conceive of an array of penalty defaults that might 
give police incentive to produce information voluntarily to avoid the 
default, it is important to select a default that offers sufficient incentive 
to police to choose the preferable route of voluntary data-generation 
and one that courts are willing to deploy in appropriate cases. An 
array of potential penalty defaults are conceivable. I propose three to 
begin the conversation.  
A strong but potentially controversial penalty default to condition 
cooperation is court-ordered production of information and potential 
institutional reforms upon identification of a violation. Courts have 
increasing experience with data-generating reforms and other 
structural reforms in overseeing consent decrees and memoranda of 
understanding arising from structural reform civil suits for 
constitutional violations by police departments.390 When faced with a 
choice between clumsy court-imposed data-gathering and remedial 
regimes or a self-designed approach, police and courts have an 
incentive to prefer voluntary data generation to design a plan that 
better fits organizational structure and needs.  
The first option is likely to be controversial because the penalty 
default of court-ordered data-gathering and remedial regimes rouses 
and raises the longstanding debate about how courts are ill suited to 
intervene so directly in police practices.391 This debate has lead to 
 
 390 See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 
2002) (detailing entry into consent decree and adjudicating who may intervene); 
Jackson v. City of Pittsburgh, 688 F. Supp. 2d 379, 397 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that 
consent decree “imposed federal oversight on the Pittsburgh Police”); Grand Lodge of 
Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(referring to consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Steubenville, and New Jersey). 
 391 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects 
in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786-790 (1970) (exploring reasons why 
judiciary has difficulty assuming effective supervisory or disciplinary role over police); 
Richard E. Myers, II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 29-
31 (2006) (analyzing limitations of courts in supervising police practices and 
particular challenge posed by evolving techniques of investigation and collecting 
literature). Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights 
and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 11, 19 (1988) (arguing “[i]n our constitutional 
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deference to the political branches to act in a number of controversial 
criminal contexts even though when it comes to protections that may 
be perceived to benefit criminals and impede the police, legislatures 
are hesitant to intervene.  
A potentially more palatable alternative penalty default in the event 
of noncooperation is referral of the police department to the U.S. 
Department of Justice for investigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
into whether there is a pattern or practice of violations. If an 
investigation is launched, the penalty default is powerful because 
investigations can lead to not only data-gathering reforms but other 
structural reforms. Moreover, the Department of Justice has already 
been designated by Congress to pursue structural reform litigation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and is a better-suited actor to negotiate 
reforms. 
An even milder and less costly potential penalty default would be to 
begin keeping score of findings of violative practices and reporting the 
record to the Department of Justice for possible inclusion on a watch 
list. A high score of accumulated identified violations would 
potentially put a department at risk of placement on a priority 
investigation list.392 Here, the penalty default has less teeth in prodding 
police to choose voluntary data-generation, because unlike the first 
approach, the choice is not between clumsy court-ordered reform 
versus voluntary data-gathering and remedial plans, or investigation 
that could lead to even more costly structural reforms versus 
voluntary data-gathering. The penalty default force of this softer 
approach to induce voluntary data-collection depends on the 
likelihood of the Department of Justice ultimately launching an 
investigation. As the number of reports accumulate, there will be a 
tipping point where there will be a strong incentive to prefer voluntary 
data-generation and self-monitoring and remedial plans. 
Pursuing a data-generating remedial approach would be at the 
judge’s discretion as a supplemental remedy upon finding a violation 
in a particular criminal case. The discretion would be exercised based 
on the judge’s experience on the front lines with cases involving the 
particular police agencies as to whether there is need for more 
information and monitoring. Judges in courts of first instance have 
 
mythology, the job of courts, after all, is to find law, to ascertain the rights of the 
individual, not to balance costs and benefits like a legislature, or even a construction 
engineer”). 
 392 For an intriguing proposal to better leverage Department of Justice resources for 
investigations under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 by using a priority list of police departments 
to investigate, see Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27-34 (2009).  
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ringside seats to the testimony and challenges of the litigants and daily 
exposure to the diet of criminal cases in the region and practices of the 
area’s police. They are, therefore, well situated to spot whether there is 
a need to inquire as to a potential pattern or practice of violations.  
Data-development remedial rules more delicately navigate the 
tensions between the need for a remedy that imposes sufficient costs 
to deter violations and the problem of overdeterring vigorous law 
enforcement. The costs of data generation are borne by a department 
rather than an individual officer, avoiding the chilling effect that is 
produced by damages suits against individual officers. Moreover, data 
generation produces the social good of better information for the 
public and avoids the controversial critique of the exclusionary rule 
that the “criminal goes free when the constable blunders.”393 
B. Enriching Public Knowledge and Deliberation When the Constable 
Blunders 
It is better, where possible, to have the police voluntarily cooperate 
in the production of data and, if needed, design of institutional 
reforms. It is cheaper to change a cooperating entity rather than 
imposing clumsy top-down measures from a distance on a recalcitrant 
organization. The penalty default strategy thus has the benefit of 
giving the police a push to cooperate in improved information-
gathering to gain more rigorous data to guide decisionmaking and 
public deliberation. A push is needed to facilitate better judicial as well 
as public deliberation. Even as it has ratcheted back the availability of 
a remedy, members of the Supreme Court have suggested the 
possibility that the Court’s stance on such matters as illegal arrests and 
searches due to police record-keeping errors or knock and announce 
rule violations might shift if data were supplied suggesting a pattern or 
rash of violations.394 Yet how are individual criminal defendants, who 
are often indigent and represented by overworked appointed counsel, 
to come by the data? A data-development remedial rule would help 
overcome the structural barriers to better-informed decisionmaking. 
 
 393 See, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 179 (1973) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting) (“It may offend many people that under our system of criminal justice the 
criminal goes free when the constable blunders, but such is the law of the land.”). 
 394 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698, 704 (2009) (suggesting that 
exclusionary rule might apply to illegal arrests and searches due to record-keeping 
errors “where systemic errors were demonstrated”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 604 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If a widespread pattern of [knock and 
announce rule] violations were shown . . . there would be reason for grave concern.”). 
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The benefits of better data for public deliberation over police tactics 
is demonstrated by the New York City Police Department’s collection 
of data on Terry stops and frisks. Political momentum for data-
gathering ignited after mass protests erupted in New York over the 
fatal shooting of Amadou Diallou, an unarmed West African 
immigrant in the Bronx by four police officers in 1999.395 The Center 
for Constitutional Rights sued the city for data after the Diallou 
killing.396 The resulting data-gathering measures adopted have 
documented the disparate impact of Terry stops, showing for example 
that Black and Latino people were nine times more likely to be 
stopped than Whites in 2009.397 Hard-fought lawsuits by impact 
litigation groups have begun an information cascade when it comes to 
the problem of racial profiling that has festered for decades. About half 
of the states have introduced racial profiling legislation, often 
requiring data collection, and some police departments have also 
begun voluntarily collecting data on the issue after successful suits in 
other jurisdictions.398  
An unarmed man should not have to be shot to death before costly 
institutional reform impact litigation succeeds in bringing police 
practices to light. Decades should not have to pass before costly and 
slow civil suits begin to prevail in securing consent decrees for reform 
and data-gathering. Structural reform civil suits, whether brought by 
organizations like the ACLU and NAACP or by the Department of 
Justice under its 42 U.S.C. § 14141 authority are extremely costly, 
slow, and rare. Successful suits by individuals are even less likely 
because they depend on a victim having the access to resources and 
extraordinary determination to bring civil suit — which may falter on 
the police-protective qualified immunity doctrine.  
Indeed, compared to the host of criminal cases in which the law has 
been clarified by defendants seeking exclusion of evidence, civil cases 
presenting criminal procedure questions are rare indeed. Professor 
Donald Dripps has observed that only four damage actions against 
police have lead to substantive Fourth Amendment decisions by the 
Court, laying aside a small cluster of cases on the execution of search 
warrants.399 A data-development remedial strategy would lower the 
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obstacles to obtaining information to facilitate detection of 
problematic police gaming. Moreover, the prospect of monitoring 
through data generation exerts its own control function. The greater 
transparency produced by data generation is a strategy of police 
Panopticism400 in which police subject to the watchful gaze of courts, 
the public and self-surveillance behave in better conformity with 
expectations. 
CONCLUSION 
The specter of police gaming haunts constitutional criminal 
procedure, difficult to detect and something we have been afraid to fully 
confront. Police gamesmanship presents a dilemma because on the one 
hand, the law and polity want police to be aggressive and willing to get 
muddy in dealing with the bad guys. On the other hand, we are worried 
enough about overly aggressive policing to enshrine constitutional 
protections and a phalanx of rules against it because policing affects the 
lives of everyone, everyday, criminal or innocent. Because of this 
ambivalence, constitutional criminal procedure doctrine has been 
murky and reticent in defining the line between fair and foul play. But 
defining this line is crucial to conditioning better behavior and 
alleviating one of the pressures behind the ever-proliferating complex of 
piecemeal patches. This Article’s exploration of the line between 
desirable police innovation and problematic rule subversion and 
taxonomy of the main forms of problematic police gaming are offered 
toward this goal.  
With this foundation, we have a clearer vantage to conceive of ways 
to curtail undesirable gaming and imagine a remedial regime that can 
better inform deliberation and surface problems earlier as well as 
deter. Police gaming is not going to go away altogether. When it 
comes to such tough problems that are submerged and not wholly 
soluble, however, surfacing the problem and mitigating the harm are 
worthy goals.401 In a time of foment, as the Court adjusts 
constitutional criminal procedure’s rules and remedies, leading to 
numerous new criminal procedure cases decided in recent years, the 
time is right for creative approaches that supplement constitutional 
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criminal procedure’s predominant decision-framing approaches and 
remedial strategies to better address the problem of police gaming.  
Incorporating anti-gaming standards in high-risk zones where the 
temptation to game is highest and monitoring is hard can help trigger 
internalization and implementation of constitutional values and steer 
officer judgment. Standards are also more elastic than brittle bright 
line rules and can block gaming through interpretation without the 
need for fashioning new rules. 
Data-development remedial rules can improve the aim of deterrence 
through an approach that leads to police rather than prosecutors 
internalizing the costs. Data-development remedial rules also allow 
society to gain in information and deliberation rather than lose when 
the constable undermines constitutional protections. Calibrating 
incentives to encourage voluntary police self-monitoring and data 
generation has the dual benefit of more efficient monitoring and the 
generation of information to surface problems earlier and permit 
better-informed deliberation and reform. 
